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Measuring and Representing the Knowledge
Economy: Accounting for Economic Reality
under the Intangibles Paradigm
OLUFUNMILAYO

B. AREWAt

INTRODUCTION

In some ways the history of Enron reflects a standard
story of corporate fraud, malfeasance, and failed corporate
oversight and governance. Any telling of this aspect of the
Enron story might focus on the misrepresentations that
were made by Enron about the nature of its business and
business practices. These misrepresentations were reflected
in Enron's securities disclosure, including its financial
statements. However, this version of the Enron saga does
not always take full account of an important element of the
broader business context within which Enron operated.
This aspect of the business context relates to the changing
nature of sources from which companies derive value today.
Another perspective from which to read the Enron story is
to consider the fact that companies today operate in a postindustrial knowledge economy that is largely based on the
use and exploitation of intangible assets such as informat Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. A.B.
Harvard College, M.A.,
Ph.D., University
of California,
Berkeley
(Anthropology); A.M. University of Michigan (Applied Economics); J.D. Harvard
Law School. E-mail: obal@case.edu. For their helpful comments, I am indebted
to George Dent, Jonathan Entin, Jill Fisch, Nancy Kim, Andrew Morriss and
participants at workshops at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Northwestern
University School of Law. This article would not have been possible without the
able research assistance of Justin Morocco and Silja Bornschlegl.
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tion technology, research and development, brand equity,
and intellectual property rights.' Existing securities
disclosure and accounting frameworks developed in the
context of companies that operated under a tangible
industrial business model in which tangible assets such as
property, plant, and equipment were the predominant
sources of value. Current securities disclosure frameworks
and the accounting regimes incorporated within such
frameworks fail to address the full implications of this new
intangibles paradigm that is a key characteristic of knowledge economy business worldview and practice. This failure
represents an important and often omitted aspect of the
story of not only Enron and other cases of corporate fraud in
the late 1990s, but more importantly of many corporations
operating in today's business environment.
The history of Enron reflects an extreme example of the
types of behaviors that are made possible and even
encouraged as a result of an accounting and disclosure
"haze" that currently surrounds intangibles. 2 Enron's public
discourse focused on presenting the company as being at
the forefront of the knowledge economy:
[We are participating in a new economy, and the rules have
changed dramatically. What you own is not as important as what
you know. Hard-wired businesses, such as energy and
communications, have turned into knowledge-based industries
that place a premium on creativity. Enron has been and always
will be the consummate innovator because of our extraordinary
people. It is our intellectual
capital-not only our physical assets3
that makes us Enron.

Although Enron aggressively advanced itself as a "new
economy" knowledge-based company within the intangibles

1. ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS AND
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (2002) ("In the last few

decades, we have experienced what have come to be called the 'information age'
and the 'knowledge economy.' . . . [1]t is now 'knowledge'-not labor, machines,

land or natural resources-that is the key economic asset that drives long-run
economic performance.").
2. See Baruch Lev, Where Have All of Enron's Intangibles Gone?, 21 J. ACCT.
& PUB. POL'Y 131, 131-32 (2002) (discussing the role of intangibles at Enron).
3. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at 2 (2000), available at http://www.enron.
com/corp/investors/annuals/annua99/pdf.html.
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paradigm, 4 the reality was quite different, and Enron did
not actually have many intangible assets. Enron's required
securities disclosures, however, did not always clearly
illustrate this fact, at least partly because Enron was quite
effective in taking advantage of the fact that current
securities disclosure and accounting requirements do not
fully or adequately address how companies should treat
intangibles. This omission facilitated Enron's ability to
present a fundamentally inaccurate representation of the
economic reality of its business and business operations.
The negative consequences of such inaccurate representations of economic reality by Enron and other companies are
exacerbated by the mismatch between intangibles paradigm
business practices and tangibles paradigm regulatory
standards.
Enron demonstrates one strategy that companies have
used to emphasize the role of intangibles in their business
operations by means of what might be termed intangibles
paradigm discourse. Intangibles paradigm discourse may be
characterized as a manner of communication about intangibles such as information technology and intellectual
property that emphasizes the role of such intangibles in
business organization and practice. 5 Through use of such
discourse, Enron took advantage of the lack of fit between
disclosure requirements and business practices. Enron and
other companies have thus benefited from the fact that
securities disclosure and accounting rules currently require
only limited disclosure with respect to intangibles. 6
A significant commentary exists, in the accounting field
in particular, concerning the implications of intangibles for
accounting frameworks. 7 From a legal perspective, much
has been written concerning the link between recent cases
of corporate fraud and questionable accounting practices, 8
4. See infra Part II and accompanying text for a discussion of the
intangibles paradigm.
5. See infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text for additional discussion
concerning Enron's intangibles paradigm discourse.
6. See Baruch Lev, Sharpening the Intangibles Edge, HARv. Bus. REV., June
2004, at 109, 112 (noting that GAAP does not require meaningful disclosure
from companies about intangibles investment except for aggregate research and
development expenditures).
7. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 33, 360, 365, 368, 384, 406 and accompanying text.
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as well as the implications of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for existing securities regulation
frameworks. 9 This Article seeks to mediate between these
existing discussions in the legal and accounting fields by
drawing attention to the fact that a fundamental paradigm
shift in business organization and practice emerged in the
latter half of the twentieth century. Although many of the
elements of this paradigm shift are at least implicitly
recognized in some existing accounting and legal commentary, this Article examines some of the specific ways in
which evidence of this paradigm shift is apparent, as well
as the consequences of this shift for business organization
and practice.
This Article focuses on the fact that a common key
element underlying issues discussed by commentators from
the legal and accounting fields is perceptible changes in
business organization and practices under the intangibles
paradigm. This changing business environment has
facilitated the "creative" accounting practices that came to
typify the securities disclosure and accounting presentations of many companies during the Internet boom of the
late 1990s.10 This new business milieu may have even
facilitated fraud at companies such as Enron. The creative
accounting practices that became increasingly recognized in
the 1990s have been facilitated by the current ways in
which existing regulatory structures approach the
intangibles paradigm. As a result, a key element in
confronting the reality of the intangibles paradigm will be
9. See, e.g., Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 1, 1 (1999) (noting that new technology requires new regulatory
approaches); Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
Capital Barrier?,2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 69-70 (1998) (noting that
the Internet "offers new methods for offering and selling securities"); Donald C.
Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation,
98 HARv. L. REV. 747, 747 (1985) (discussing the influence of information
technology on securities regulatory frameworks); Nancy C. Libin & James S.
Wrona, The Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable Match?, 2001
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 601, 602-04 (discussing the implications of the Internet for
the securities industry); Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial
Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987,

1996 (1997) (noting that law has continued to develop to accommodate
technological innovation); Daniel Everett Giddings, Comment, An Innovative
Link Between the Internet, the Capital Markets, and the SEC: How the Internet
Direct Public Offering Helps Small Companies Looking to Raise Capital, 25
PEPP. L. REV. 785, 788 (1998) (discussing Internet direct public offerings).
10. See infra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
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the development of regulatory structures that truly incorporate recognition and understanding of the implications of
the intangibles paradigm for actual business practice.'
The implications of changing business practices for
securities disclosure and accounting frameworks are quite
significant. Although accounting deals with numbers, which
seem fixed and determinate in the minds of many,
accounting decisions often involve art rather than science
and include choices about characterizations and framing
that can be flexible. 12 Part I of this Article focuses on the
operation of securities disclosure and accounting rules in
contemporary business contexts and the fact that companies often have and exercise choices about how to frame and
present financial and operational data. Part II discusses the
intangibles "paradigm" and moves to specific consideration
of the relationship between securities disclosure and
accounting frameworks and business organization. It also
considers characteristics of the intangibles paradigm shift
and the implications of the intangibles paradigm for
accounting systems and business practices. Part III looks at
the intangibles "haze" resulting from the intangibles
paradigm. This haze involves uncertainty about the extent
to which accounting treatment of intangibles adequately
represents the underlying economic reality of business
practices and transactions under the intangibles paradigm
and the potential ramifications of such uncertainty. Part IV
touches on additional legal issues, including some related to
corporate governance in the intangibles paradigm. Part V
assesses the regulatory implications of the intangibles
paradigms and makes suggestions for how to incorporate
better recognition of the intangibles paradigm into existing
regulatory structures.
11. See infra Parts IV.B-V and accompanying text.
12. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 9

(2005) ("[Alccounting is an art, not a science. While lawyers may think of GAAP
as a single set of rules that must be followed, it is perhaps better to think of it
as a set of standards that leave considerable discretion for management and its
accountants to choose the method of reporting some transactions."); DAVID F.
HAWKINS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS: TEXTS AND CASES v

(3d ed. 1986) ("Today corporations have considerable leeway in how they report
[Many areas remain in
their financial condition and results of operations ....
which alternative practices are equally acceptable for reporting essentially
identical business situations. The profits of the reporting company will vary
depending on which alternative is used.").
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SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE
FLEXIBILITY OF COMPANY PRESENTATIONS

A. The Challenges and Economic Importance of Intangibles
The intangibles haze is compounded by the ever
increasing magnitude of intangibles. Although the current
magnitude of intangibles in the broader economy is difficult
to know with precision, one estimate suggests that at least
six to ten percent of United States gross domestic product is
spent annually on intangibles.' 3 Annual investment in
intangibles has been estimated to be at least $1 trillion,
with an estimated current equilibrium value of intangibles
of more than $5 trillion. 14 This suggests that one-third of
the value of corporate assets in the United States comes
from intangibles. 15 Intangibles now also constitute on
average sixty to seventy-five percent of corporate market
value.16

The fact that intangibles are an increasingly important
source of value for companies today reflects a shift in
dominant business production and operation models to ones
involving significant utilization of intangibles. 17 Intangibles
have become important largely as a result of economic
factors that have intensified since the mid-1980s,

13. Leonard Nakamura, What is the U.S. Gross Investment in Intangibles?
(At Least) One Trillion Dollars a Year! 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/
wps/2001/wpOl-15.pdf; see also M.M. Croes, Data for Intangibles in Selected
OECD Countries, STAT. NETHERLANDS,
Dec. 2000, http://www.cbs.nl/
NR/rdonlyres/B8CD6247-DFOC-4828-8B2E-3783408CDAOC/0/OECDezRapp.pdf
(comparing intangibles data in several member countries of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development).
14. Nakamura, supra note 13, at 1, 5.
15. Id.
16. Letter from Baruch Lev, Professor of Accounting and Finance, Stern
School of Business, New York University, to Representative W.J. "Billy" Tauzin,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 4, 2002), availableat http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-blevl
docs/Answerstoquestions.pdf.
17. See infra Part II.A-D.1 and accompanying text.
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particularly
increased
competition
resulting
from
globalization and deregulation and an upsurge of ICTs.1s
As a result of these changes, a significant number of
businesses now operate under a paradigm based on
accumulation and utilization of intangibles, 19 both alone
and in conjunction with tangible assets or products. Prior to
this shift, most businesses operated under a tangible asset
paradigm. 20 In addition to increased use of intangibles in
the production of goods and services, an expansion has also
occurred in the consumption of goods that are themselves
nonphysical,
such as digital products, services, and entertainment. 21
18. See infra Part II and accompanying text for a discussion of this
paradigm shift. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DIRECTORATE
FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, DSI/IND(97)23/FINAL, INDUSTRIAL
PERFORMANCE

AND

COMPETITIVENESS

IN AN

ERA OF GLOBLALISATION

AND

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 3 (June 9, 1998), available at http://www.olis.oecd.
org/olis/1997doc.nsf/0/5a39458c278dda96802566ad00567487?OpenDocument
(follow "Industrial Performance and Competitiveness in an Era of Globalisation
and Technological Change" hyperlink) [hereinafter OECD]; BARUCH LEV,
INTANGIBLES 9 (2001) (discussing the factors underlying increased competition).
19. As used herein, the term paradigm reflects and is based upon the model
of scientific worldview and practice based on paradigm shifts developed by
Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).

20. See J. Bradford DeLong, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz,
Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 19, 20 (H. Aaron
et al. eds., 2003); Claudia Goldin, Labor Markets in the Twentieth Century, in,
III THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 549, 611 (Stanley

L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000) (stating that human capital
accumulation and technological change in the twentieth century plays the role
that physical capital accumulation played in nineteenth century in serving as
the engine of growth); Leonard Nakamura, Intangibles: What Put the New in
the New Economy, FED. RES. BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., July/Aug. 1999, at 3; Jan-

Erik Grojer & Ulf Johanson, Voluntary Guidelines on the Disclosure of
Intangibles: A Bridge Over Troubled Water? 2 (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritumI/downloadfVolunt.doc (last visited Feb.
24, 2006); Lionel Nesta & Pier-Paolo Saviotti, Intangible Assets and Market
Value: Evidence from Biotechnology Firms 3 (Working Paper, 2003),
http://www.mot.chalmers.se/dept/idy/workshop2003/nestasaviotti.pdf
(noting
that intangible capital has overtaken physical capital since 1950s).
21. See Charles Goldfinger, Understanding and Measuring the Intangible
Economy: Some Suggestions for Further Research 4 (Aug. 1, 1997) (unpublished
paper), CIRET Seminar, Helsinki, available at http://www.gefma.com (follow
"Intangible Economy" hyperlink, then follow "presentations" hyperlink, then
follow "Understanding and Measuring the Intangible Economy: Some
Suggestions for Further Research" hyperlink) (noting consumption of
nonphysical goods).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

The dominant nineteenth century model of industrial
production, which persisted well into the twentieth century,
was founded on the use of economies of scale and mass
production based on exploitation of physical assets. 22 Some
argue that the electronics revolution that began in the
1970s led to an increase in intangibles, at least partly
made intangibles investbecause the electronics revolution
23
ment more remunerative.
Consequently, included within and closely associated
with the intangibles paradigm is the increasingly dominant
ICT sector. 24 Although increased investment in intangibles
has emerged as a core feature of the ICT sector, the
intangibles phenomenon is broader. Intangibles have
become associated with increased business value for both
and for uses both
ICT and non-ICT intensive companies
25
ICTs.
involving
not
and
involving
22. See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 37-38; Gr6jer & Johanson, supra
note 20, at 2; Nakamura, supra note 13, at 6-9 (noting that historically tangible
assets were the resources that produced wealth); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private
Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1990) (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989)) ("The United States has
witnessed a steady decline in heavy manufacturing, while the industries most
affected by intellectual property law-such as entertainment and computer
software-have flourished.").
23. See Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt & Shinkyu Yang, Intangible Assets:
How the Interaction of Computers and OrganizationalStructure Affects Stock
Market Valuations 4 (working paper), available at http://grace.wharton.
upenn.edu/-lhitt/itqo.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (finding in empirical study
that each dollar invested in computers is associated with an increase in firm
market valuation of $5 to $20 as compared with an increase of $1 for
investments in other areas and that high information technology user firms
were more likely to adopt modified business organization and work practices,
which increased firm value of certain technology intensive companies beyond
what would be accounted for by tangible assets alone); DeLong et al., supra note
20, at 19; Nakamura, supra note 13, at 5; see also OECD, supra note 18, at 3
(indicating that the core mechanism of the new model is increasing returns on
knowledge across broad spectrum).
24. See Goldfinger, supra note 21 (exploring the hypothesis that the
complementary relationship between new intangible organization assets and
information technology capital parallels that of memos and filing systems, and
the printing press and factory redesign, and the adoption of electric motors); see
also Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23, at 2; DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 3738. For further discussion of how intangibles may be defined, see infra notes 3445 and accompanying text.
25. See James Guthrie et al., Intangibles and the Transparent Enterprise:
New Strands of Knowledge, 4 J. INTELL. CAP. 429, 429 (2003).
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As intangibles have become increasingly pervasive, the
challenges such resources pose for existing systems and
practices have become all the more apparent. Further,
questions have arisen that are not yet resolved regarding
how such resources should be treated under existing
regimes and systems of measurement such as securities
disclosure requirements, accounting rules, intellectual
26
property laws, and national income accounting systems.
Such regimes and systems were not developed in
contemplation of the current business environment in
which intangibles form a critical core. 27 As a result, the
advent of intangibles has diminished 28the effectiveness of
certain regulatory systems and checks.
With the rise of intangibles has thus come a certain
level of confusion as to how existing categories, rules and
regulations initially drawn up in the context of a tangibles
paradigm should apply under an intangibles paradigm.
This confusion is evident in the application of legal rules,
including intellectual property and securities laws, as well
as in the accounting area. 29 Although existing securities
disclosure and accounting practices may be applied in this
new intangibles oriented context, new regulatory systems to

26. See also Bart van Ark, UnderstandingProductivity and Income Gaps in
the OECD Area: Are ICT and Intangibles the Missing Link, (Groningen Growth
and Dev. Ctr. & Conference Bd. Working Paper, 2002) (discussing the extent to
which ICT and intangibles may explain gaps in labor and productivity national
income statistics); see generally LEV, supra note 18 (giving a general overview of
the role of intangibles largely from an accounting and policy perspective).
27. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Quality
Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets, Speech at Economic Club (Oct. 18,
1999), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm (noting
that as intangibles become more important questions have arisen about
whether existing disclosures standards reflect the true value of intangibles as
drivers of value).
28. See infra Part III.B-C and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part III.A-C and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue with respect to accounting; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Strategic
Behaviors and Competition: Intangibles, Intellectual Property and Innovation
(2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the
implications of the increasing predominance of intangibles for intellectual
property frameworks) [hereinafter Arewa, Strategic Behaviors]; Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private Offerings in the Cyberspace Era:
Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 331
(2006) (discussing some implications of the cyberspace era for private securities
offerings).
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of intangibles and ICTs have not
deal with the implications
30
been developed.
Changes have been made in legal and accounting rules
as a result of Enron and other instances of corporate fraud.
These changes include adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002,31 as well as modification of accounting requirements with respect to the special purpose entities (SPEs)
32
that played such a prominent role in Enron's activities.
Despite these modifications, the lack of attention to issues
relating to accounting treatment generally, and the
changing nature and role of intangibles in business practice
more specifically, makes such reforms unlikely to clear the
intangibles haze. 33
B. Defining and Classifying Intangibles
Intangibles, which include, among other things,
information technology, research and development, brand
equity, intellectual property rights, corporate culture, stockholder relations, access to markets, knowledgeable workers,
and management and human resources, are also referred to
as knowledge assets and intellectual capital.3 4 Intangibles
may include discovery/innovation aspects, such as new
products and patents, human resources factors such as
compensation and work practice and organizational capital
30. See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 813, 830 (2003) (noting that current accounting treatment of
intangibles is an historical relic from a time when concern may have existed
about booking nonexistent assets and that keeping such treatment "in place for
decades, while the importance of wealth created by R&D has increased, is
inexcusable").
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) (2002).
32. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
33. Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules
versus Principles versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1027 (2003) (noting
that an uncertain regulatory outcome is likely for Sarbanes-Oxley, which was
intended to address corporate accounting scandals and restore confidence in
securities markets, but which was a response that essentially regulates the
accounting profession, while containing "very little direct regulation of
accounting treatments and audit practice").
34. Michael G. Harvey & Robert F. Lusch, Balancingthe Intellectual Capital
Books: Intangible Liabilities, 17 EUR. MGMT. J. 85, 85 (1999); see Kenneth L.
Kraemer & Jason Dedrick, Strategic Use of the Internet and E-Commerce: Cisco
Systems, 11 J. STRATEGIC INFO. Sys. 5, 5 (2002).
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aspects, which would include Cisco's web-based virtual
organization, Wal-Mart's integrated inventory and supply
and Dell's built-to-order computer distribution
operations,
35
channels.
Although the term asset is often used to refer to
intangibles, many intangibles are not accounting assets in
the traditional sense. 36 A clear lack of consensus exists as to
how intangible assets should be defined, 37 and how intangibles are classified may depend on the person making the
definition. 38 The most basic definition of intangible assets is
a negative definition in which intangibles are considered to
be nonphysical, nonfinancial assets. 39 However, a wide
range of definitions exists. 40 Most would probably agree
that intangible assets are capital assets that lack physical

35. See David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Research and Development
Productivity in the Chemical Industry 6-7 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at www.stern.nyu.edul-blev/chemical-industry.doc
("Cisco's web-based product installation system was estimated by Cisco's Chief
Financial Officer to save $1.5 billion over 3 years.").
36. An accounting asset can be treated as a capital expense and recorded on
a company's balance sheet. See Gregory H. Bentson, Accounting Numbers and
Economic Values, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 166 (1982) (noting that assets and
liabilities are recorded following an arms-length transactions where a change in
legal title to goods or the establishment of a legal obligation to pay in the future
occurs).
37. See Ulf Johanson, Mobilising Change: Characteristics of Intangibles
Proposed by 11 Swedish Firms 5 (Technical Meeting, June 9-10, 1999),
International Symposium, Measuring and Reporting Intellectual Capital,
Experience, Issues, and Prospects, Amsterdam, available at http://www.oecd
org/dataoecdl16/21/1947886.pdf (noting that intangibles are poorly defined and
any consensus in classifications is the exception rather than the rule).
38. Id. at 6; see also Croes, supra note 13, at 4 ("[A]ccountants, managers,
policy makers and statisticians would define [intangible assets] differently...").
39. Croes, supra note 13, at 4; LEV, supra note 18, at 8-10 (noting that such
nonfinancial, nonphysical factors are expected to generate future productive
benefits to the individuals or firms that control their use and contribute to or
are used in the production of goods or provision of services).
40. Magali Demotes-Mainard, Statistical Information on Intangibles 2 (Oct.
6-10, 2003), Voorburg Group on Service Statistics, 18th Meeting, Tokyo,
available at www.stat.go.jp/english/info/meetings/voorburg/pdf/mag-stat.pdf
(noting that this negative definition may be a hollow definition); see also
GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 15-54 (3d ed. 2000) (giving a comprehensive overview of
various types of intangibles).
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substance, but which are likely to yield future benefits. 41 A
three-fold classification of intangibles frequently proposed
42
distinguishes structural, human, and market intangibles.
Intangibles may also be embedded within and interact
extensively with physical assets. 43 As a result, a clear-cut
delineation between tangible and intangible assets is not
always possible, particularly in the ICT arena.
Part of the reason intangibles are so difficult to define
is a consequence of the polymorphic and ubiquitous nature
of the information or knowledge upon which they are often
based. 44 This is also a reason why so much confusion exists
with respect to intangibles in the accounting and legal
spheres. Establishing boundaries, practices, and procedures
with respect to resources and assets for which definitions
41. See Leandro Caflibano, Manuel Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi & M. Paloma
Sinchez, The Value Relevance and Managerial Implications of Intangibles: A
Literature Review 10-14 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritumldownload/value.pdf (acknowledging
multiple definitions of intangibles and seeing point of agreement as a view of
intangibles as sources of probable future economic profits, lacking physical
substance and controlled by a firm as a result of previous events or
transactions). International Accounting Standard 38, issued by the
International Accounting Standard Committee, defines an intangible asset as
an "identifiable nonmonetary asset without physical substance held for use in
the production or supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for
administrative purposes." International Accounting Standard Committee,
International Accounting Standard 38, at 7 (July 1998) [hereinafter IAS 38];
see also Hervd Stolowy et al., Accounting for Brands in France and Germany
Compared with IAS 38 (Intangible Assets: An Illustration of the Difficulty of
InternationalHarmonisation), 36 INT'L J. ACcT. 147, 147-48 (2001) (noting the
increasing importance of intangibles in economic life and business success and
noting continuing debate over the appropriate accounting treatment and values
of brands in different countries).
42. Grojer & Johanson, supra note 20, at 12; Jason Hurwitz et al., The
Linkage between Management Practices, Intangibles Performance and Stock
Returns, 3 J. INTELL. CAP. 51, 56 (2002) (identifying four areas of intangibles
assets: human capital, organizational capital, customer capital and intellectual
property); Jan-Erik Grojer, Intangibles and Accounting Classification:In Search
of a Classification Strategy, 26 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'y 695, 696-700 (2001) (noting
the challenges today for financial accounting classifications that must cope with
an organizational world that has become more immaterial than material and
suggesting ways in which intangibles could be classified).
43. See LEV, supra note 18, at 7.
Goldfinger, Intangible Economy and its Implications for
INT'L STAT. REV. 191, 198 (1997) ('More
generally, economists have difficulties coming to grips with the polymorphic and
ubiquitous nature of information, simultaneously a good, a production asset and
a market attribute.").
44. Charles

Statistics and Statisticians, 65
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vary, potentially significantly, presents certain challenges. 45 These definitional issues have serious implications
not only for accounting treatment and consequently
securities disclosure, but also for the uses of intangibles by
companies under the intangibles paradigm.
C. Securities DisclosureRequirements and Accounting
Rules
A major factor contributing to the uncertainty and
resulting higher risk for intangibles is the fact that the true
economic value and nature of intangibles are not
adequately addressed by financial statements prepared in
accordance with United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP is the principal source of
guidance and authority for the preparation of company
financial statements in the United States. 46 The development of accounting and auditing standards in the United
States has historically included both the SEC and private
standards setting organizations. The SEC has largely,
although not entirely, ceded responsibility for setting
accounting standards to private organizations such as the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 47 whose
standards are treated as generally48 accepted under current
securities disclosure requirements.
The SEC has considerable statutory authority to
establish accounting and auditing standards. Both the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) set minimum
standards for accountants that prepare company financial
statements. 49 The Exchange Act 50 and the Investment
45. For a discussion of the implications of this boundary-marking process
from a legal perspective, see Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 19-58.
46. Gary Shorter, Auditing and Accounting Regulation: Key SEC Powers 2
(Jul. 8, 2002), Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RS21257,
available at http://www.shelby.senate.gov/legislation/leg-pdf/account3.pdf
(noting that financial statement preparation rules such as GAAP are intended
to help ensure that financial data are presented fairly and are comparable
between firms and industries).
47. See infra notes 56 to 61 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 55.
49. Section 17(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Items 25 and 25
of Schedule A of the Securities Act of 1933 require that the financial statements
of registered companies be audited by independent public or certified
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Company Act of 194051 give the SEC authority to set
accounting standards to be used to prepare required
financial statements as well as auditing standards. 52 In
addition, the SEC has promulgated Regulation S-X, which
53
governs registrant preparation of financial statements.
Despite this statutory and regulatory authority and
framework, the SEC has largely delegated GAAP rulemaking authority to FASB, 54 which is the primary authority that makes accounting determinations in the United
States. 55 As the primary accounting rule-making authority,
accountants. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) and (26) (2000); 15 U.S.C.A § 78q (1997 &
Supp.2005).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1997 & Supp. 2005); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (2000).
52. See George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public
Accounting Before and after Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1325 (2003) (discussing
SEC authority to set accounting and auditing standards); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1997
& Supp. 2005); 15 U.S.C. 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (2000 &
Supp. II 2002); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (2000) (giving the SEC the authority to set
auditing standards).
53. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2005).
54. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1037 n.49 ("The SEC already has the power to
impose accounting rules. The SEC exercises its power only rarely, preferring to
leave the job to FASB, which acts under the threat of intervention should the
SEC's preferences not be satisfied.") (citing DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J.
BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 146 (3d ed. 2001)); see also
FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY
RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 58-59, General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(Oct. 2002) (GAO-03-138), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf
[hereinafter GAO Report] (discussing the relationship between the SEC and
FASB); HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that the SEC made known very
early in its existence its expectation that the private sector would assume the
main role in establishing accounting rules).
55. See Tracy N. Tucker, It Really Is Just Trying to Help: The History of
FASB and Its Role in Modern Accounting Practices, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 1023, 1027-28 (2003) (noting that although its authority derives from
federal securities law, FASB is a private rule making body); see also SEC,
Accounting Series Release No. 150, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2259, at *1-5 (Dec. 20,
1973) (identifying FASB standards as generally accepted for the purposes of
federal securities laws); SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 280, 1980 SEC
LEXIS 798, at *8-10 (Sept. 2, 1980) (noting FASB's role in establishing and
improving accounting principles); SEC, Policy Statement: Reaffirming the
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8221 (Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/338221.htm (reaffirming post-Sarbanes-Oxley that FASB standards are
considered generally accepted for the purposes of federal securities laws).
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FASB is at times subject to heavy industry lobbying and
pressure with regard to its policies and pronouncements,
which in the past has influenced its decisions in connection
with reform proposals. 56 Although the SEC typically defers
to FASB, it does at times issue its own accounting standards, and may impose particular standards for accounting
statements in SEC filings. 57 On the audit side, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
has historically largely controlled generally accepted
59
auditing standards (GAAS), 58 which are related to GAAP.
The AICPA was displaced by the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) established under Sarbanes60
Oxley.
56. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1033 (noting that the accounting
profession "used its influence to stifle FASB's reform initiatives concerning
accounting for stock options .... "); Stephen A. Zeff, Evolution of U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 27-29, Outline of a presentation at an
International Symposium on Accounting Standards sponsored by the Ministry
of Finance of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, July 12, 2004, available at
www.iasplus.com/resource/0407zeffusgaap.pdf (discussing FASB failure, in face
of considerable opposition from the high technology industry in particular, to
issue SFAS 123, which concerned expensing of employee stock options, after
Congress indicated its intent to put FASB out of business if the standard was
issued).
57. Jerry Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the
Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 768 (2003) (noting
that SEC imposes accounting standards through rules and SEC releases); see
also SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin 101-Revenue Recognition in Financial
Statements, Securities Act Release No. SAB 101 (Dec. 3, 1999), 17 C.F.R. § 211,
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabl01.htm.
58. Audits are comprehensive reviews and certifications of a company's
financial statements conducted by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), who are
qualified to conduct audits and certify a company's books and records. See
Markham, supra note 57, at 765-66 (noting that audits are conducted by
qualified CPAs).
59. Shorter, supra note 46, at 2-3 (noting that GAAS and GAAP have a
complementary relationship; audits, which are governed by GAAS, are the
expression of an opinion of a company's financial statements, which are
normally prepared in compliance with GAAP).
60. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) (2002); see also Benston, supra
note 52, at 1325; Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees
After Enron, et al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off the Edge in
the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 117-120 (2003) (discussing the
PCAOB and FASB); see also PCAOB Website, http://www.pcaobus.org (last
visited Apr. 3, 2006) (describing the PCAOB as a private-sector non-profit
corporation created by Sarbanes-Oxley to oversee auditors of public
corporations in order to protect the interests of investors and the public interest
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GAAP is an important standard with respect to
company financial statements, and a statement of
compliance with GAAP is a standard part of audited
financial statements for public and private companies. An
auditor's opinion is a critical part of audited financial
statements, and companies do their utmost to ensure that
they receive a clean opinion (i.e., without qualification) from
their auditors. 61 Such audited financial statements form an
important and prominent aspect of companies' required
securities disclosure. Company securities disclosures may
also include unaudited financial statements that are not
strictly in compliance with GAAP in quarterly 10-Q
Reports, for example. 62 The exclusion under GAAP from
company balance sheets of an increasingly large portion of
the value of firms, including value derived from intangibles
such as knowledge, technology, clients, and other factors, is
at the core of concerns about accounting measurements and
in the preparation of informative, fair and independent audit reports); AICPA,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act/PCAOB Implementation Center, http://www.aicpa.org/
sarbanes/index.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2006) (providing background, tools, and
information concerning Sarbanes-Oxley and the PCAOB).
61. See HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that management of a company
is responsible for the content of financial statements and that statements issued
by independent certified public accounts reflect the accountant's personal
opinion as to their fairness, degree of conformity with GAAP and consistency
with accounting practices in previous accounting periods). Enron's 2000 Annual
Report includes such an opinion from Arthur Andersen, which reflects the
critical language in an auditor's opinion regarding a company's financials
comply with GAAP. An audit opinion that reflects the language below is
considered a "clean" audit opinion. Arthur Andersen's Enron audit opinion
included the following language: "In our opinion, the financial statements
referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of
Enron Corp. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the results
of their operations, cash flows and changes in shareholders' equity for each of
the three years in the period ended December 31, 2000, in conformity with
accounting principles generally accepted in the United States." ENRON, 2000
ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2001) [hereinafter ENRON 2000 ANNUAL REPORT]; WILLIAM
POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 25 (2002) [hereinafter
POWERS REPORT] (noting that Andersen issued an unqualified audit opinion in

2001 despite the fact that internal emails suggested that Andersen had
concerns about Enron disclosure of related party transactions).
62. See HURON CONSULTING GROUP, AN ANALYSIS OF RESTATEMENT MATTERS

2-3 (2003), available at http://huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/Huron_
RestatementStudy2002.pdf (noting that an auditor's association with quarterly
financial statements is limited to review procedures of less significant scope
than the procedures for an audit).
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consequently securities
disclosure standards under the
63
intangibles paradigm.
The lack of comprehensive disclosure requirements for
intangibles has given companies greater latitude to
represent economic reality with regard to intangibles. In
addition to being a dominant factor in the market-to-book
gap,6 4 the intangibles paradigm has significantly affected
business structure and business practice in a multitude of
ways. 65 Of particular interest is how the intangibles
paradigm has influenced company representations of economic reality in presentations of themselves vis-h-vis
public
66
markets and the implications of such framing
D. FinancialStatement Presentations
1. Core Aspects of Financial Statement Presentation.
Financial statements are core elements of companies'
representations of the economic reality of their business
and form an important element of companies' securities
disclosure. In addition, investors and others rely on
financial statement presentations in evaluating companies
for investment and other decisions. The basic financial
statements of companies are generally standardized, with
the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement being important aspects of most financial statement
presentations. These standard accounting statements are
incorporated into securities disclosure requirements
through Regulation S-X, which requires that registrants file
certain specified financial statements, including balance

63. Steven M.H. Wallman, Remarks at the International Intellectual
Property Institute Presentation: Intangible Assets, Valuation and Accounting
Standards 5 (May 1, 2002) http://www.iipi.org/confrences/Accounting
_Standards/transcript.pdf (last visited March 17, 2006) ("GAAP . . . [is]
floundering with regard to the question of what to do with intangibles, and it is
something which I think is starting to become a crisis as opposed to simply an
interesting problem to resolve.").
64. See infra notes 164 to 189 and accompanying text.
65. See generally JUERGEN

H.

DAUM,

INTANGIBLE

ASSETS AND

CREATION (2003); see Brynjolfsson et al., supranote 23 at 1, 6.
66. See infra notes 190 to 210 and accompanying text.
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6 9 and
sheets,6 7 income statements, 68 cash flow statements,
70
statements of changes in stockholders' equity.
In general, balance sheets are statements as of a
specified point in time that describe the assets and
liabilities of a company. 71 Balance sheets are indicative of a
company's liquidity, solvency, and financial flexibility. 72 In
contrast, income statements cover a specified period of time
and describe the sources of revenues and expenses for a
company during that time period. 73 Income statements
generally give an indication of the profitability, investment
value, and creditworthiness of a company's business operations. 74 A cash flow statement, which can be derived from
the numbers in the balance sheet and income statement,
reconciles financial statements, which are often based on
accrual principles, to actual flows of cash
in a business
75
operation during a specified period of time.
In contrast to cash accounting, which records revenues
and expenses as cash is received or spent, accrual principles
would recognize such revenues or expenses and record them
in financial statements based on certain accounting rules
that govern accruals. 76 These rules often have nothing to do
with the time of receipt or payment of cash. 77 As a result,
the intersection of accrual principles and the intangibles
paradigm may create potential opportunities for companies
to manipulate financial data. In addition to the actual
numbers in the financial statements, financial statements
are usually accompanied by notes that give further detail
67. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant
balance sheets).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-02 to -03 (2005) (outlining requirements
instructions for registrant income statements).

and

69. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-02 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant cash
flow statements).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-04 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant
statement of changes in stockholders' equity).
71. DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 170 (2004).
72. Id. at 170-71.
73. Id. at 124.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 190.
76. Id. at 93.
77. Id.
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concerning application of relevant accounting principles and
other factors underlying the numbers that appear in the
financial statements. 78 The balance
sheet, income
statement, and cash flow statement are core aspects of most
financial statements. These financial statements, together
with their notes, are intended to give a79fairly complete
picture of a company's business operations.
Despite the use of the same core financial statements to
measure and depict company performance, financial
statement presentations are by no means uniform and will
often vary, for example, depending on the nature and
substance of a company's business. As a result, a venture
capital fund's financial statements will typically look
different than an operating company's financial statements
in terms of the sorts of assets and liabilities that are
evident in each and the nature of sources of revenues and
expenses.8 0 Similarly, the financial statements of a
manufacturing company will generally look, in terms of
types of assets and liabilities and sources of revenues and
expenses, unlike 8 those of a company that primarily
produces software. '
2. Framing and Financial Statement Presentations
under the IntangiblesParadigm.In addition to variations in
financial statements that reflect fundamental differences in
companies' businesses and operations, companies may
choose to represent a given economic or business reality in
disparate ways. The intangibles paradigm has intensified
pressure on existing fault lines in accounting regimes that
govern business. Accounting rules relating to revenue
recognition and the capitalization or expensing of expenditures, among others, are areas in which accounting
treatment is particularly significant and frequently
material to a company's business operations and stock

78. Id. at 42.
79. See infra notes 83 to 87 and accompanying text.

80. A venture capital balance sheet, for example, would typically primarily
include assets such as cash and portfolio company investments. A typical
operating company would likely have far more assets connected to business
operations, such as plant, property and equipment, for example.
81. A manufacturing company is far more likely to have significant amounts
of fixed assets such as real estate and plant, property and equipment.
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market valuation.8 2 As such, companies have considerable
interest in framing their businesses and operations using
accounting measures that depict them in the best possible
light. This framing is apparent, for example, in how
companies manage earnings in order to meet and beat
analysts' expectations of earnings, and is particularly
practices companies use to
evident in the accounting
83
accomplish this objective.
Securities
disclosure
requirements
incorporate
accounting rules and practices that often give companies
some degree of flexibility in how they may characterize
their business and operations. The accounting choices a
company makes often reflect management conceptions
about the company's business model. Such framing occurs
in the context of existing accounting rules and practices
that are used to determine appropriate accounting
treatment for a particular transaction. The goal of these
accounting rules and practices, which are incorporated into
securities disclosure requirements, is to present a fair
84
picture of a company's financial condition and operations,
which may at times be in tension with the company's desire
to frame its business operations or a particular transaction
in a certain manner.
Choices companies make about accounting treatment
are influenced by accounting rules as well as companies'
framing of their business and operations and consequently
representations of economic reality. A decision about
whether to capitalize an expenditure and place the
82. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that revenue recognition has
been the principal reason for financial restatements in recent years. See HURON
CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 62, at 10 (noting that revenue recognition was
the leading cause of financial restatements between 1997 and 2002, causing
20.7% of such restatements, while capitalization and expensing of assets was
the fifth leading cause, contributing to 7.9% of such restatements).
83. See Ann Reilly Dowd, How Cooked Books Threaten Directors, CORP.
BOARD MEMBER, Winter 1998, at 1, available at-http://www.boardmember.com/

issues/archive.pl?articleid=10577.
84. GAO Report, supra note 54, at 43 (The "SEC views the integrity of
financial reporting as a 'fundamental building block' of the full and fair
disclosure that gives investors confidence in U.S. markets."); Christine E.
Earley et al., Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise of
Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1013, 1015-16 (2003) (discussing requirement under GAAP that financial
statements fairly present the financial condition of ' company and its
operations).
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purchased item on the company's balance sheet, for
example, may differ depending on the nature of the expenditure and whether the expenditure relates to intangible or
tangible goods or services. Under current accounting rules,
physical property such as buildings is generally treated
differently than expenditures for intangibles such as the
development of a web-based virtual organization to handle
internal and external business operations.8 5 This differential treatment results in buildings appearing on balance
sheets as capital expenses, while the majority of the value
associated with building the virtual organization would
most likely be treated as an operating expense on the
during the time periods in
company's income statement 86
which such expenditures occur.
The consequences of this differential treatment can be
illustrated by a simplified example.8 7 For the purposes of
this example, assume a company has an income statement
reflecting $100 in revenues and $50 in expenses in a given
time period, giving the company $50 in profit during that
period, and a balance sheet with $100 in assets and $100 in
liabilities as of that point in time. If this company were to
spend $50 to purchase a building, which is a tangible asset,
the accounting treatment for the purchase of the building
would likely be different from $50 spent to develop a largely
intangible web-based virtual organization. In the case of the
$50 spent to finance the building, assuming that the
company takes out a mortgage loan for the entire $50
expenditure, the company's balance sheet would change.
The $50 building would now be added as an asset on the
balance sheet, offset on the liability side by a debt of $50,
reflecting the mortgage the company has taken out to
finance its purchase. The result would be that the company
would now have $150 in assets and $150 in liabilities. In
contrast, the company's expenditure of $50 for the webbased virtual organization would not change the company's
balance sheet, because the web-based virtual organization,
85. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 274 to 292 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Cisco's virtual organization.
87. This example is simplified in many ways, including in assuming, for
example, that no other expenses are associated with the building purchase or
mortgage, that no tangible assets are recorded on the balance sheet as part of
the development or the virtual organization and that the building does not
depreciate.
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consisting largely of intangibles, would typically be
considered an operating expense, not a capital expense. As
a result, the $50 spent for the virtual organization would be
recorded as an expense on the company's income statement.
This would mean that the company would now have $50 in
additional expenses or $100 in revenues and $100 in
expenses, which would mean that the company's profitability has been reduced because where it previously had $50 in
profit, it now has $0 profit since revenues and expenses are
equal. This simple example illustrates in a small sense the
potential variations that may emerge in company financial
statements just as a result of the relative intensity and
scope of intangibles in company business operations. In
aggregate, such differences are potentially
quite significant
88
and in some instances problematic.
However, accounting rules also offer companies choices
about the accounting treatment they use to represent the
economic reality of a particular transaction. In the case of a
building, a company could buy a building and record it as
an asset on the company's balance sheet, offset on the
liability side by a debt that might reflect a mortgage that
the company might have taken out in connection with the
purchase of the building, for example. Alternatively, the
company could transform the characterization of this building for financial statement purposes by constructing a
synthetic lease.8 9 This ability to transform representations
of economic reality in financial statements has significant
implications under the intangibles paradigm by virtue of
the nature and treatment of intangibles under current
accounting rules.

88. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
89. See Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Finance, Financial

Accounting and Tax Ownership, 25 J. CORP. L. 445, 446 (2000) ("In a synthetic
lease transaction, money is borrowed based on the financial strength of a tenant
of property and on that tenant's agreement to pay rent. The lender expects the
debt to be serviced from the rental obligation of the tenant rather than from the
financial resources of the nominal owner and borrower. The lease is 'synthetic'
insofar as it is designed to achieve a blended treatment: the tenant reports it as
an operating lease for financial accounting purposes but as a mortgage for
federal income tax purposes.").
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E. Synthetic Leases and FinancialStatement
Transformations
1. The Structure and Magnitude of Synthetic Lease
Transactions.A synthetic lease transaction would typically
involve a company establishing a third party SPE that
would be characterized as independent from the company
for financial statement purposes. Such independence would
mean that SPE financial statements would not need to be
consolidated or combined with the financial statements of
the company setting up the synthetic lease transaction (the
"sponsor company"). By removing this transaction from the
company's balance sheet and making it appear "off balance
sheet," the company may be able to keep any debt
associated with the building purchase from influencing its
financial ratios. 90 SPEs are typically created for the
particular transaction or series of transactions. 91 Prior to
the Enron controversy, accounting rules for independence
for an SPE were generally interpreted by FASB and the
SEC to require that three percent of the capitalization of
the SPE be comprised of equity contribution from an owner
not connected to the sponsoring company setting up the
SPE. 92 In addition, the owner of such equity actually
needed to be at risk with respect to its equity contribution
to the SPE and had to exercise control over the SPE to
avoid consolidation with sponsor company financial
statements. 93 Following the Enron controversy, FASB
90. See infra notes 103 to 107 and accompanying text.
91. See Weidner, supra note 89, at 448 (noting that SPEs are created solely
for the purpose of entering into a financing transaction or transactions); Jalal
Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities
Revised: FASB Interpretation 46(R), CPA J. ONLINE (July 2004),
(noting that
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/704/essentials/p30.htm
SPEs are created by a party to carry out a "specific purpose, activity, or series of
transactions" and "have no purpose other than the transactions for which they
are created").
92. See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91.
93. Id.; see also FASB, EITF 90-15: Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors,
Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions,
available at http://accounting.cba.uic.edu/Articles/Off-Balance-Sheet/FASB%20
EITF%2090-15.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006) (setting 3 percent as the
minimum third-party interest in an SPE to avoid consolidation of the SPE with
sponsor company financial statements); Bala G. Dharan, FinancialEngineering
with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF
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issued new criterion increasing the three percent standard
the revised rule does not establish
to ten percent, although
94
test.
bright-line
a
SPEs are widely used by businesses in the United
States, particularly in securitization transactions. A
random review of sixty-six public companies in 2001 found
that disclosed SPE transactions accounted for close to $230
billion in value, with ninety-two percent involving securitizations of receivables and the remaining eight percent
involving leases. 95 These figures may reflect only a portion
of actual transactions involving SPEs since under current
financial statement reporting requirements, SPEs established by a sponsor company may remain undisclosed and
thus essentially hidden from readers of sponsor company
financial statements. 96 The total size of just the synthetic
lease market for real estate, equipment, and other assets
may be as large as $600 billion. 97 The dangers of undisclosed SPEs are illustrated by Enron, which developed
thousands of such SPEs as a way to remove and conceal
losses as well as debts and other liabilities. 98 In most cases,
THE ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES 103, 114-16

(Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., 2002) (discussing changing
consolidation rules for SPEs and noting that the 3 percent rule was an ad-hoc
solution intended as a short term band-aid that subsequently became standard
practice); POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 38-9 (noting that in addition to
making a substantive capital investment in an SPE, and having the substantive
risks and rewards of ownership during the entire term of the transaction, the
independent owner of the SPE must exercise control over the SPE to avoid
consolidation).
94. See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91; see also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, INTERPRETATION No. 46(R), CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE
INTEREST ENTITIES 63 (2003).
95. See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91.
96. See id.
97. Dharan, supra note 93, at 107 (noting that estimates of the size of the
synthetic lease market vary, and that as much as $600 billion in real estate,
equipment, and other assets may be accounted for using synthetic leases in the
United States).
98. See, BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuyS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 128 (2003) (noting
Enron delayed recognition of losses by refusing to write off dead deals); POWERS
REPORT, supra note 61, at 13-14, 97-98 (noting that Enron entered into
"hedging" transactions using the "Raptor" vehicles that looked superficially like
economic hedges, but which were actually only "accounting" hedges that were
designed to circumvent accounting rules by "recording hedging gains to offset
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however, Enron's financials did not comply with applicable
accounting rules. 99 The accuracy of representations of
economic reality in accounting presentations involving
SPEs is largely dependent on the adequacy and transparency of accompanying disclosure, the nature of the
underlying accounting treatment, and extent to which such
accounting treatment is actually disclosed.
In a typical synthetic lease transaction, an SPE would
acquire or construct the building and would be the borrower
on paper of any mortgage associated with the building. 100
The SPE would then enter into a short-term lease (usually
less than ten years) with the typically high credit-rating
sponsor company. 1 1 The transaction documents between
the SPE and the mortgage lender would give the mortgage
lender "assurance that its debt is secure and provide the
corporate user [sponsor company] with essentially all of the
material benefits and burdens of ownership of the real
the
estate including, importantly, the right to capture
102
benefit of appreciation in the value of the property."'
This would mean that the company would report less
debt on its balance sheet than it would without the

losses in the value of [Enron] merchant investments on Enron's quarterly and
annual income statements").
99. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 4 ('Many of the most significant
transactions apparently were designed to accomplish favorable financial
statement results, not to achieve bona fide economic objectives or to transfer
risk. Some transactions were designed so that, had they followed applicable
accounting rules, Enron could have kept assets and liabilities (especially debt)
off its balance sheet; but the transactions did not follow those rules."); Bratton,
supra note 33, at 1042 ("Enron's financials would have been out of compliance
with GAAP even with its SPEs in compliance with the rules on consolidation at
all times."); Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting that Enron's failure is "a case
of SPEs run amok").
100. See Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other
Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLuM. Bus. L.
REv. 35, 54-58; Weidner, supra note 89, at 447 ("In terms of the desired
outcome, a synthetic lease is a transaction in the form of a lease that embodies
a blend of characteristics that enables it to be characterized as a lease for
financial accounting purposes, while also permitting it to be treated as the
nominal tenant's mortgage or 'financing transaction' for federal income tax
purposes.").
101. Luppino, supra note 100, at 54.
102. Id. at 55.
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synthetic lease, all other things equal. 103 If structured in
accordance with applicable accounting rules, the synthetic
lease transaction should enable the company to treat its
payment obligations under the synthetic lease transaction
as a lease obligation that it can treat as a long term rental
obligation (operating lease) as opposed to a debt obligation
that would be reported as a balance sheet liability (capital
lease). 104 Synthetic leases thus allow a particular representation of a certain economic reality for financial
statement reporting purposes that may permit the
sponsoring company to transform its depiction of such
underlying economic reality. 05 The SPE involved in a
103. See id. at 50-51 (noting that management avoids balance sheet debt
because "various ratios used by analysts to value companies are negatively
affected by high debt"); Weidner, supra note 89, at 450-51 ("Synthetic leases
keep certain assets and liabilities off balance sheet and also improve the ratios
by which businesses are judged. In general, a business looks less leveraged
when it can take a long-term liability off its books. In addition, the business
may improve certain calculations and financial ratios that are often closely
monitored. For example, because no asset is booked if a lease is classified as an
operating lease, the lessee need not take a charge against earnings for
depreciation. This favorably impacts the share price-to-earnings ratio and the
earnings-to-assets ratio. In short, by keeping a heavily encumbered asset off the
books, a user may preserve a more favorable return-on-assets ratio, a more
favorable return-on-equity ratio, and a more favorable debt-to-equity ratio.");
POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 37 (noting that Enron management preferred
off-balance-sheet treatment for financial statement purposes in order to
"present itself more attractively as measured by the ratios favored by Wall
Street analysts and rating agencies").
104. See Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-69. Compliance with several FASB
requirements would need to be met for the company to treat the synthetic lease
transaction as a lease obligation (operating lease) as opposed to a debt
obligation (capital lease). See ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 13 (Fin. Accounting Bd. 1976) [hereinafter FASB 13]
(discussing treatment of capital and operating leases); ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES:
SALE-LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING REAL ESTATE, SALES-TYPE LEASES OF
REAL ESTATE, DEFINITION OF THE LEASE TERM, INITIAL DIRECT COSTS OF DIRECT

FINANCING LEASES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 98 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1988) [hereinafter FASB 98] (amending FASB 13
and other FASB statements); see also Weidner, supra note 89, at 454-55 (noting
that lessees (sponsor companies) seek to avoid application of FASB 98 in
constructing synthetic lease transactions since FASB 98 has a stricter
requirement with respect to debt obligations appearing on the lessee's balance
sheet).
105. Weidner, supra note 89, at 487 ("Unlike the federal income tax law, the
financial accounting standards have been less stable and definitely need fixing.
Most simply, FASB currently permits enormous amounts of debt to vanish from
a company's balance sheet. Corporations are permitted to appear far less
leveraged than they are by recasting mortgages as leases. In a system that
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synthetic lease would not, however, necessarily be
independent from the company in any real economic terms.
As a result, in contrast to financial statement presentation,
tax treatment of the synthetic lease would reflect the actual
underlying economic reality of the transaction. 0 6 The
sponsor company would thus be considered the owner with
regard to the tax treatment of any debt liability associated
with the synthetic lease transaction. 0 7 The differential
treatment of synthetic leases for book and tax purposes
reflects the potentially varying ways in which companies
can depict a given economic reality in different contexts of
presentation. Such differential presentations are by no
means limited to synthetic
leases and other financial
08
statement transformations.1
2. Synthetic Leases, SPEs, and Transforming
Representations of Economic Reality. Although SPEs such
as those associated with synthetic leases may have a
genuine underlying business purpose, they can also be
entered into with the specific goal of removing debt or other
liabilities from a balance sheet, or managing income
statement earnings by being able to report gains or losses
prides itself on transparency, this transactional sleight-of-hand should not be
permitted.").
106. The differential tax treatment of synthetic lease transactions and the
fact that the company would generally be considered an owner for tax purposes
is indicative of the underlying economic reality of the transaction. The existence
and role played by the SPE does not change this fundamental economic reality.
See Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-59 (discussing tax treatment of synthetic
leases); Weidner, supra note 89, at 486-87 (comparing financial accounting and
tax treatment of synthetic leases).
107. Dharan, supra note 93, at 108 (noting that the sponsor company does
not have to report the building in a synthetic lease transaction as a capital lease
because control of the building is held by an SPE whose legal structure
prohibits the sponsor company from "controlling" it); Luppino, supra note 100,
at 51, 59-60 (noting that the tenant (sponsor company) in a typical synthetic
lease transaction is the owner of the property for tax purposes, enabling the
sponsor company to use such debt to its benefit for tax purposes, which permits
the company to "support loss deductions, allow for nontaxable receipts of cash,
and, in general, drive tax deferral."); Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 91
(noting that synthetic leases serve two important purposes, enabling a company
to treat a lease as an operating expense, recording payments as rent expense
while keeping the underlying assets and liabilities off its balance sheet and
allowing a company to treat the transaction as if it owned the leased property
for tax purposes).
108. See infra Part II.C.1 and accompanying text.
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when desired.109 Synthetic leases and other off-balance
sheet financing transactions facilitated by SPEs highlight
important aspects of financial statement rules. The first is
that, in addition to having a goal of presenting a fair and
accurate picture of a company's finances and operations,
accounting rules may be used legitimately in such a way as
to obscure underlying economic reality. Furthermore,
accounting rules have the potential to transform the
depiction of this underlying reality by, for example, turning
an owner of a building into a tenant for financial statement
reporting purposes. The extent to which financial
engineering or any transformative or obscuring representations are apparent to readers of financial statements is
dependent on how a company chooses to frame its business
and financial statement presentations, the structure of the
transformative transaction, and the adequacy of the
company's disclosure. 11 0
Accounting treatment of intangibles more generally
illustrates another area where securities disclosure
requirements and the accounting rules that they incorporate may not fully reflect or accurately represent
underlying economic reality. Intangibles are typically not
capitalized and placed on a company's balance sheet and
are now a predominant source of value for many companies.
As a result, the information that a reader of a financial
statement may receive from reading a balance sheet, for
example, is potentially quite different for companies
operating under an intangibles as opposed to tangibles
paradigm business model. Under the intangibles paradigm,
present accounting treatment leads to many of the most
valuable assets of a company not even appearing on a
balance sheet to the extent that such value is associated
with intangibles. This is the reason why financial
statements, particularly balance sheets, may have become

109. See Bala G. Dharan, Enron'sAccounting Issues: What Can We Learn to
Prevent Future Enrons?, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

113, 117-18 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2003) (noting that
SPEs may serve a number of purposes, including hiding debt or poor performing
assets, earnings management or quick execution of related party transactions
at desired prices).
110. See Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting the "power of SPEs as
financial engineering tools").
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less informative and less reflective of economic and
business fundamentals under the intangibles paradigm. 1 '
F. Intangiblesand FinancialStatements
Part of the uncertainty in the application of accounting
rules to intangibles and ICT-era business practices is
related to the nature of intangibles themselves. Also
relevant is the fact that existing accounting systems now
applied to intangibles were developed largely in the context
of a business milieu built around a physical asset industrial
production paradigm. 11 2 Existing accounting systems have
been characterized as obsolete in light of the changing
business context of their use.11 3 Current accounting and
securities disclosure frameworks are based on assumptions
rooted in the past about tangibles paradigm business
operations that are no longer valid for a significant number
of companies. 11 4 For example, the concept of "cost" inherent
in existing accounting systems only makes sense in light of
costs being viewed under the assumptions of tangibles
paradigm manufacturing business practices and operations
11 5
as attaching to a product as it flows through a factory.
This mismatch between tangibles paradigm accounting
rules and disclosure standards and increasingly prevalent
intangibles paradigm business operations is a factor in the
increasing failure of accounting systems to provide accurate
information that is reflective of the true economic value of a
business.116 The divergence between regulatory structures
111. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text.
112. See H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT S. KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE
RISE AND FALL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 6-18 (1987) (giving an overview of

the historical context of the development of accounting systems); see also Peter
Walton,

International Accounting and History, in

EUROPEAN

FINANCIAL

REPORTING: A HISTORY 1, 3 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (noting that the financial
reporting world is intimately linked with business environment).
113. See JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 183-207.

114. See Walton, supra note 112, at 1 ("[T]he ensemble of accounting
practices and regulations in any one country at any given time are not
representative of the present but are rather an accumulation of past decisions
which have been modified in response to many different stimuli over a span of
time .... ).
115. See JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 187 (noting that factory
analogy provides the best explanation of how the accounting system works).
116. See id. at 205.
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and business practice is intensified by the typically
incremental nature of change in accounting regulation as
compared to the relatively rapid nature of changing
business practices associated with the intangibles
paradigm.117
At the same time, with the intangibles paradigm, a
significant amount of value is now attributed to intangibles
by public markets, which has contributed to strategic
behavior by businesses with respect to intangibles.1 18 The
ethos underlying such behaviors is recreated and reinforced
through framing and business discourse at two levels:
externally in the strategic intellectual property management literature and internally by virtue of business
documents such as annual reports that position companies
within the midst of this intangibles paradigm in a way
intended to maximize company market valuations. 119 The
strategic intellectual property management literature is
supplemented and reinforced by internally generated
company business documents, which include annual
reports, SEC filings, and company websites.
This association between intangibles, business, and
market value has significantly affected how businesses are
organized and operate. 120 More specifically, the changes in
business organizational structure and operational strategy
associated with the intangibles paradigm have implications
for systems that regulate business behavior.' 2 ' The full
117. See Walton, supra note 112, at 3 (noting incremental nature of
accounting regulation).
118. See Arewa, Strategic Behavior, supranote 29, at 59-84.
119. The strategic intellectual property management literature is a body of
work in the business field that discusses the appropriate uses of intellectual
property assets by companies. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text; see also Brynjolfsson et
al., supra note 23.
121. W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS,
THE NEW PARADIGM: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 11-23 (1999), available at http://

www.dallasfed.org/fed/annual/1999p/ar99.pdf (discussing organizational and
other changes associated with the ICT-era); OECD, supra note 18, at 4 ("The
development of intangible investments has been complemented by the
expansion of service activities and extensive organisational change."); Baruch
Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to
Extend Them 27 (NYU Working Paper, Feb. 1999), available at http:!!
pages.stern.nyu.edu-blevboundaries.doc (highlighting the fact that intangibles
are a major driver of business change).
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magnitude of the effects of intangibles for business
enterprises remains uncertain. 122 Assessment of the nature
and uses of intangibles and the shift to the intangibles
paradigm provide further evidence of exactly how accounting and other regulatory systems fail to require disclosure
of information that accurately represents the economic
reality of the intangibles paradigm economy and business
practices.
II. THE INTANGIBLES "PARADIGM": THE CHANGING CONTEXT
OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT
Intangibles are inherently different from physical and financial
assets. Managerial and regulatory systems are slow to adapt to
these differences, resulting in widespread adverse private and
social consequences. . . . A productive discourse on intangibles
should be based on a thorough analysis of the economics of
intangibles, an understanding of the incentives and motives.., of
the major players . . . and a careful empirical documentation of the
123
economic consequences of the rise of intangibles.

A. Accounting Systems and Business Organization
1. Tangibles Paradigm Business Organization from a
Historical Perspective. One critical aspect of the shift to an
intangibles paradigm is increased internalization of
corporate transactions and sources of value. 124 This distinguishes the intangibles paradigm from business paradigms
that have arisen in the past. Accounting and bookkeeping
systems developed to record information relating to transactions existed even in the ancient world. 25 The nature of
the information that accounting systems need to explain
122. See OECD, supra note 18, at 10 ("Overall, public policy is hampered by
lack of knowledge and understanding of the extent and importance of intangible
assets in enterprise strategies and practices. Intangibles need to be measured,
reported and accounted for more explicitly, to strengthen their internal
management and develop reliable external guides to their value for capital
markets and resource providers.").
123. LEV, supra note 18, at 20.

124. See infra notes 284 to 292 and accompanying text. The importance of
internally generated intangibles is reflective of this phenomenon.
125. See JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 6.
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may differ depending on the dominant organizational
paradigms of businesses that use such systems. For
example, before the nineteenth century, under a preindustrial business paradigm, the dominant forms of
business organization tended to be characterized by exchange transactions between owners-entrepreneurs and
external individuals involving raw material suppliers,
piecework labor, and customers. 126 In such a pre-factory
system, a piece rate or market-based price was paid for "the
output of independent artisans or subcontractors who
carried out almost every
process involved in the
127
manufacture of a product."'
With the tangibles paradigm that became ascendant
during the Industrial Revolution, business owners began to
exploit economies of scale to achieve gain and commit large
sums of capital to production processes with an overall
business focus on accumulating physical capital. 128 This led
to a business focus on managing hierarchical organizations
rather than conducting all business through market transactions. This is exemplified in the dominant industrial
factories that emerged under that
paradigm in the textile
1 29
and steel industries, for example.

126. See id. at 6, 19-21.
127. Id. at 22-23; see also JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (2002) (noting that, although large

firms were widespread prior to the Industrial Revolution, "most of their
employees were domestic laborers (working in a cottage industry)").
128. See JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 6-7 (noting commitment of
significant sums of capital to production processes); Goldin, supra note 20, at
611 (noting focus on accumulation of physical capital as characteristic of
nineteenth century industrial production).
129. JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 7, 21-45; see also William L.
Baldwin, The Corporation and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional
Approach, 27 VT. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (2003) (discussing how dominant
nineteenth century business models resulted in the demand for forms of
business organizations that could efficiently manage capital investments and
technical economics of scale and scope); see also John Richard Edwards &
Edmund Newell, The Development of Industrial Cost and Management
Accounting Before 1850: A Survey of the Evidence, 33 Bus. HIST. 35, 38, 53
(1990) (placing the origins of industrial accounting in the cotton and metal
industries and suggesting that precursors of modern accounting frameworks are
more varied than is often stated); James Foreman-Peck, Accounting in the
Industrialization of Western Europe, in EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A
HISTORY 11-28 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (discussing the relationship between
the history of European accounting and economic history, noting that with
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The emergence of these structures under a tangibles
paradigm changed the nature of the accounting information
that companies needed to operate. 130 For example, steel
magnate Andrew Carnegie's operating strategy enabled
him to make profits, even during economic recessions when
he cut prices, and outlast competing firms that went out of
business. 131 Management accounting, which entails use of
accounting information for planning, decision making, and
control, developed to accommodate and support these
"profit-seeking activities of entrepreneurs for whom
multiprocess, hierarchical, managed enterprises were more
efficient than conversion processes through continual
transactions in the marketplace." 132 Nineteenth century
managers of capital-intensive companies thus made
"sophisticated use of accounting information to rationalize
the operations
of large single-activity manufacturing
133
concerns."
The history of the relationship between accounting
systems and business operations is thus one in which
accounting frameworks have often adjusted to meet the
needs of changing business operational and organizational
structures. For example, the development of audited financial statements and auditing procedures is closely linked to
the increased need for companies to raise funds from more
widespread sources of outside capital. 34 Current accounting
frameworks were basically fully formed by 1925.135 These
industrial capitalism, developments in accounting were dependent on the goals
of management).
130. JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 7 (noting that a need arose for
measures "to determine the 'price' of output from internal operations," in order
to determine profits).
131. Id. at 33-34 (noting that Carnegie's strategy "was to push his own
direct costs below his competitors' so that he could charge prices that would
always ensure enough demand to keep his plants running at full capacity").
132. Edwards & Newell, supra note 129, at 39 (noting that management
accounting may be distinguished from cost accounting, which focuses on
identification and accumulation of cost, and financial accounting, which has the
goal of providing accounting information to external parties).
133. JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 34.
134. Id. at 130 (noting that prior to 1900, although a few American
industrial companies issued periodic financial statements, virtually none of
these financial reports were audited and that firms were eventually able to tap
outside resources by providing investors with audited financial statements).
135. Id. at 12, 125.
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frameworks have not been fundamentally reassessed 136
in
light of the implications of the intangibles paradigm,
which is an important factor in the intangibles haze. 137 The
structure and use of intangibles in contemporary business
operations demonstrates how current accounting and disclosure frameworks function in today's intangibles oriented
business and economic climate.
2. Virtual Business Organization: The Case of Cisco.
The use of information systems by Cisco Systems, the
world's largest networking equipment company, illustrates
some of the organizational and operational effects of
engagement with the intangibles paradigm in the ICT
sector. Cisco's Internet Protocol (IP)-based networking
solutions form the foundation of many Internet networks
worldwide. 138 Founded in 1984 by a group of Stanford
computer scientists, Cisco began operations as a company
that made routers, physical devices developed at Stanford
University
that join multiple computer
networks
together. 139 Cisco shipped its first product in 1986 and
expanded its range of product offerings in the 1990s to
include switches, which are devices that join multiple
computers together. 140 Cisco also grew at an extraordinary
rate, with annual revenues increasing from $70 million in
1990 to more than $18.9 billion in 2000 and $24.8 billion in
2005.141

136. Id. at 14 ("When cost systems became automated on digital computers,
starting in the mid-1960s, the system designers basically automated the
manual systems they found in the factory. Left unquestioned was whether these
systems were still sensible given the great expansion in information technology
represented by electronic, digital computers and the already changed nature of
the organization's operations.").
137. See infra Parts II and III and accompanying text.
138. Brit Wittman, Cisco Systems Puts its HR Programs and Processes On
Line and Reaps Big Productivity Gains, 23 J. ORG. EXCELLENCE 43, 43 (2003)
(noting that Cisco IP solutions are the "foundation of the Internet and most
corporate, education and government networks around the world").
139. Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 10.
140. Id.

141. Id. (indicating that 1990 Cisco revenues were $18.9 billion); CIsco,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2005), available at http://www.cisco.comlweb/about/

ac49/ac2O/acl9/ar2005/printable.html (reporting that 2005 Cisco revenues were
$24.8 billion).
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Cisco has created "a virtual organization that
incorporates its suppliers and business partners to make its
value chain more efficient." 142 As part of its globally
networked business model, Cisco supports its business
strategy by making extensive use of the Internet and ecommerce. Cisco also integrates its customers, suppliers,
channel partners, and service partners into its own
information systems. 143 Cisco describes itself as a "business
. . .based on a networked fabric of communications and
collaboration that uses Internet applications to improve
productivity, reduce time to market, increase revenue, and
build relationships.' 44
Cisco's business strategy enabled it to automate routine
customer questions through use of the Internet. This
automation enabled Cisco to use its engineers' time more
effectively. Automation also permitted Cisco engineers to
spend time on more challenging technical questions. 145 This
strategy also meant that Cisco could avoid a serious
constraint on its growth that would have resulted from
engineers spending time on routine questions instead of
supporting Cisco's sales of its core router and switch
products. 146 Rather than hire new engineers or have
existing engineers handle routine customer needs, Cisco
automated such requests, developing the Cisco Connection
Online (CCO), Cisco's virtual organization that extends to
all aspects of Cisco's operations, including internal
operations. 147 Cisco also has a virtual finance organization
(VFO) that permits company management to view financial

142. Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 26.
143. Id. at 20.
144. Cisco ,1998 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1999), availableat http://www.cisco.com/
reportlinkslaunch.
enIUS/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/aboutciscoannual
html.
145. See Shawn Tully, How Cisco Mastered the Net, FORTUNE, Aug. 17, 1998,
at 207.
146. Id.
147. See

Cisco,

1997

ANNUAL

REPORT

12

(1998),

available

at

http://www.cisco.com/en[US/about/ac49/ac2O/ac19/ac15/aboutciscoannual-repo
rt linkslaunch.html [hereinafter, CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that
Cisco began developing the CCO in 1993).
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information through
Web-based applications on a daily and
148
hourly basis.
Cisco also uses the Cisco Employee Connection (CEC),
an Intranet, internally to provide human resources
information and support Cisco employees. Interactive tools
have been developed for facilities, travel arrangements,
technical documents, human resources, training, sales and
marketing, and financial matters. 149 Cisco has described
itself as the "single largest user of e-commerce in the
world,"'150 which reflects the pervasive use of information
systems at Cisco. In fiscal year 2000, 90% of Cisco's $18.9
billion in sales came from online purchases, and 82% of
151
customer inquiries were handled online.
Examination of Cisco's financial statements in light of
its extensive use of intangibles and ICT technology in its
organizational and operational structure reveals one of the
paradoxes of intangibles paradigm financial statements.
Cisco's virtual organization is clearly a core aspect of the
operation of Cisco's business both externally in relation to
customers and internally with respect to company
organization and operations. The importance of Cisco's
virtual organization is also discussed widely in commentary
about the company and at least mentioned in most
discussions of52the company's business in financial and other
1
publications.
The place where extensive discussion of Cisco's virtual
organization is most noticeably lacking is in Cisco financial
statements and its disclosure in reports and SEC required
filings in general. As a result, the costs of this virtual
organization are difficult to assess and evaluate from the
perspective of such financial statements and disclosure.
This virtual organization is thus not adequately reflected as
a separate entry on Cisco's balance sheet, income statement, or in the notes to Cisco's financial statements
because it is characterized by a high degree of intangible

148. See Stephen F. Jablonsky, Cisco's 'Virtual" Finance Organization,12 J.
CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 29, 30-31 (2001).

149. See Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 20.
150. Id. at 22.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., supra notes 34, 138, 145 and 148 and accompanying text.
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resources. 15 3 The expenditures Cisco has made with respect
to this virtual organization are likely contained within the
General and Administrative Expenses of the Cisco income
statement during the years that expenditures have
occurred in connection with the virtual organization. 154 The
exact nature and amount of expenditures in building this
virtual organization remain remarkably unclear from the
perspective of Cisco's financial statements and other
disclosure. The absence of disclosure about Cisco's
intangibles investments is of particular concern given the
significance of the virtual organization for Cisco's
operations. As a result of this lack of disclosure, the actual
operation of this virtual organization is not at all
transparent. In fact, more is disclosed at times concerning
this critical aspect of Cisco's operations in magazines and
business articles on Cisco than is typically evident in
Cisco's financial statements or other disclosure. 155 The role
of the virtual organization at Cisco, including the CCO and
153. Some of the costs of Cisco's virtual organization may be reflected in the
breakdown of net property and equipment on Cisco's balance sheet. For the
fiscal year ended July 26, 2003, for example, the total amount of computer
equipment and related software carried on Cisco's balance sheet was
approximately $1.15 billion out of total assets of $3.7 billion, as compared with
$1.02 billion and $4.10 billion for the prior fiscal year. Cisco, 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT (2004), available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac2O/acl9/
aci5/about ciscoannual reportjlinks launch.html. However, since Cisco has a
history of making many acquisitions, some portion of these assets on its balance
sheet may be a result of its accounting for acquisition transactions. The
allocation if the purchase price in an acquisition is reflected, for example, in the
discussion of the allocation of the purchase price of the January 1995 Cisco
acquisition LightStream Corporation. See Cisco 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 147, at 41. The allocation of the $120 million LightStream purchase price
was primarily for purchased research and development ($95.8 million), plant
and equipment ($1.8 million), and goodwill ($19.7 million). Id. The remaining
purchase reflected cash, accounts receivable and other current assets. See infra
Part III.A and accompanying text for a discussion of the accounting treatment
of intangibles.
154. For example, the Management Discussion and Analysis portion of the
Cisco 1997 Annual Report suggests that at least some expenses connected to the
development of information systems are included in the General and
Administrative Expenses portion of Cisco's income statement, noting: "The
dollar increase reflects increased personnel costs necessary to support the
Company's business infrastructure, including those associated with its new
European Logistics Center, as well as the further development of its information
systems." Cisco 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 25 (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., supra notes 34 and 138 for articles discussing Cisco's virtual
organization.
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CEC, is comparable to the role that factories played with
industrial companies operating under tangibles paradigm
business models. As was characteristic of the factory that
was at the center of many tangibles paradigm business
operations, the virtual organizations involving information
systems and other largely intangible and internally
generated resources developed by companies under the
intangibles paradigm are often critical to such companies'
business success as well as the scalability of their operations.
The lack of disclosure concerning a fundamental aspect
of Cisco's operations is notable when contrasted with
accounting treatment of core tangible assets. Existing
financial statement reporting and SEC disclosure requirements reflect tangibles paradigm assumptions by requiring
156
specific disclosures with regard to tangible assets.
Comparable specific required disclosure does not exist with
respect to intangible resources. This means that existing
frameworks do not adequately delineate what may need to
be modified so that required disclosures may more fully and
adequately
represent economic
reality
under the
intangibles paradigm. 157 Identifying how intangibles are
used will help illustrate their pervasive presence in
business today and why the relative absence and lack of
transparency of internally developed intangibles in the
financial statements of companies such as Cisco may be
problematic.
B. Intangibles and Business Practice:The Uses of
IntangibleResources
1.The Role of Intangibles. Intangibles play a growing
role in American business, in the U.S. economy, and
globally. 158 Market services and intangible goods now
account for more than two-thirds of U.S. GDP.159 Services
increased from twenty-two percent of GDP in 1950 to some
156. Item 102 of Regulation S-K ("Description of Property"), for example,
requires specific disclosures with respect to physical properties. See Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2005).
157. See infra Part V and Conclusion and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text.
159. See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH 7
(2001).
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thirty-nine percent in 1999.160 Intangibles are primary
drivers in the post-industrial era and are increasingly
important factors in wealth creation and economic
growth. 161 Intangibles are also increasingly viewed by
businesses as critical to the enhancement
of their competi62
tive advantage and productivity. 1
At the same time as intangibles are becoming more
important, the relevance of financial statements is

160. Id. at 11; see also Margaret M. Blair, et al. Clarifying Intellectual
Property Rights for the New Economy (Georgetown University Law Center,
Working Paper No. 274038) available at http://papers.ssrn.compaper.taf?
abstractid=274038.
161. See Aboody & Lev, supra note 35, at 6-7 (noting that most corporate
growth in developing economies in the last twenty to thirty years has been
generated by intangible assets); DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 18, 37-38
(noting that ideas and technology deriving from such ideas are primary longterm causes of economic growth, with information technology and the
manufacture of physical goods relating to such information technology boosting
growth rates of gross output by an estimated one percent per year); Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Market Economies and Rule of Law,
Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm ("Only in recent decades, as the economic
product of the United States has become so predominantly conceptual, have
issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights come to be seen as
significant sources of legal and business uncertainty."); The European
Commission, ICT Investment in the Intangible Economy § 2.1, available at
http://www.ll-a.fr/eu-epsilon/resources/ict/home.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006)
(noting that average ICT growth rate between 1987 and 1994 was almost twice
that of world GDP growth rate).
162. See LEV, supra note 18, at 11-20; The European Commission, supra
note 161, at § 1 (noting that the prime determinants of success today are
grounded in information and knowledge); Cafiibano et al., supra note 41, at 5
(noting progressive movement in the last two decades to a knowledge-based
technology intensive economy in which investments in intangibles are an
essential part of competitive position and business viability and that efficient
management of such knowledge is a major source of competitive advantage);
Clark Eustace, New Modes of Competitive Advantage for the Intangible
Economy (Nov. 1999), http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/issues/intangibles/
C Eustacefull-pres.html (commenting that the knowledge economy has led the
business community to rethink the relationship between intangibles and
corporate performance because intangibles are recognized as a prime source of
competitive advantage, leading to strategic deployment of intangibles as key
business assets); see also JONATHAN Low & PAM COHEN KALAFUT, INVISIBLE
ADVANTAGE: How INTANGIBLES ARE DRIVING BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 26 (2002)
(noting that the transition to an intangibles economy has "seriously and
substantially ratched up the level and place of competition").
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decreasing. 163 When, as has been the case at companies
such as Cisco and Microsoft, a balance sheet includes assets
that reflect only five to ten percent of the market value of a
company, reasonable questions may arise as to the
usefulness of such balance sheets as a source of
information. 16 4 The effectiveness of balance sheets as
measures of economic value is integrally connected to the
gap between market values and book values of assets.
2. The
Market-to-Book Ratio: A
Reflection of
Intangibles? In 1982, $62.30 of every $100 invested in
stocks was spent on tangible assets, while in 1992, only
$37.90 of every $100 was spent on such assets, 16 5 a decrease
of thirty-nine percent during the course of the decade. One
indicator seen as a marker of the importance of intangibles
as sources of business value for companies is the divergence
between two measures of company value: the market value
of public companies as reflected in the companies' stock
prices and the book value of such companies' assets on their
balance sheets. 166 This gap between market value and book
value is at least partially associated with
the value placed
on companies' intangibles by investors. 167
163. See Eli Amir & Baruch Lev, Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial
Information: The Wireless CommunicationsIndustry, 22 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4-5
(1996) (finding that financial information alone is irrelevant for valuation of
cellular companies, but that such information, combined with nonfinancial
information, may contribute to the explanation of stock prices); Jennifer Francis
& Katherine Schipper, Have Financial Statements Lost Their Relevance?, 37 J.
ACCT. RES. 319, 319.20, 349-50 (1999) (discussing and evaluating empirically
assertions about the decline in explanatory power of earnings statements and
finding mixed evidence in support of such assertions).
164. See infra notes 168 to 190 and accompanying text.
165. DAUM, supra note 65, at 4.
166. LEV, supra note 18, at 31-33; THOMAs A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL 295-296 (1998) (stating that gap actually measures the intensity of
knowledge assets rather than the relative amounts of intangibles versus
tangible assets and is thus not an accurate measure of intangibles because
market values rise and fall with exuberance and book value is based on
historical cost while market value includes market valuation of future
earnings); Patrick H. Sullivan, Introduction to Intellectual Capital
Management, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE
FROM INNOVATION 4 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998).
167. See Sullivan, supra note 166, at 4; Lev, supra note 2, at 132 (noting
that this gap also reflects the difference between current and historical cost
values of physical assets); J.B. Backhuijs, W.G.M. Holterman, R.S. Oudman,
R.P.M. Overgoor & S.M. Zijlstra, Reporting on Intangible Assets 6, Final Report

2006]

THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

Chart 1. Market-to-Book Ratio, 1973-2002
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Sources: Lev, infra note 169; Lev, infra note 170.

The trend during the intangibles era has been toward
an increasing market-to-book gap. As is evident in Chart 1
above, the ratio of market to book value, which reflects this
gap, progressively increased for Standard & Poor's 500
(S&P 500) companies from a level of 0.81 in 1973 to 1.69 in
1992,168 which means that in 1973 the book value of assets
recorded on balance sheets was actually greater than the
stock market values of these companies, constituting more
than 120 percent of market value. By 1992, however, forty
percent of total market value of S&P 500 companies was
not reflected in assets on their balance sheets. 169 This ratio

for the Benefit of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Intangible Assets
Pilot Project Sounding Board Group (June 9-10, 1999), at www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/61/43/1947807.pdf.
168. Prior to 1975, U.S. companies were permitted to capitalize research
and development expenses. See Aswath Damodaran, Research and Development
Expenses: Implications for Profitability Measurement and Valuation 3 (Stern
School of Business Working Paper, 1999), available at www.stern.
nyu.edu/-adamodar/pdfiles/papers/R&D.pdf.
. 169. Baruch Lev, Remarks on the Measurement, Valuation and Reporting of
IntangibleAssets, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 17, 17 (2003).
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was 6.25 in 1999,170 suggesting that six of every seven
dollars of corporate market value was derived from
knowledge assets, 17 1 and reached its peak of 7.5 in March
2000.172 Following market adjustments in 2000 and 2001,
the ratio was still 4.2 in August 2002,173 suggesting that
over three-quarters of the total market value of S&P 500
companies was not reflected in assets on their balance
sheets. Movement of the market-to-book value ratio reflects
the fact that intangibles are a significant and quite volatile
aspect of corporate value today. 174 It also signals 175
a
fundamental shift in corporate and societal asset bases.
Despite the volatility of this measure and the influence of
broader market movements, the numbers indicate a fundamental change in aggregate S&P 500 balance sheets since
1972. The magnitude of market-to-book gap is also reflected
in company specific numbers for both ICT and non-ICT
companies. 176 The magnitude of the gap between market
and book value is, not surprisingly, typically greater for ICT
companies. 177
170. S&P 500 companies account for seventy-five percent of the total assets
in the U.S. economy. See Baruch Lev, Knowledge and Shareholder Value 2,
(Jan. 2000), available at www.stern.nyu.edu/-blev/knowledge&shareholder
value.doc.
171. Id.
172. Lev, supra note 169, at 17. The 2000 numbers also reflect public equity
markets at their highest value in recent years.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (discussing shift
in the asset base of companies and societies).
176. In early 1999, for example, the equity of Proctor & Gamble (P&G) had
a market value of over $121.7 billion. The amount of equity recorded on P&G's
balance sheet was $12.2 billion. SMITH & PARR, supra note 40, at 89. Since
equity reflects a company's net assets (or assets minus liabilities), this suggests
a significant gap between financial statement value and market valuations of
P&G. The P&G numbers highlight the significance of intangibles in companies
outside the ICT sector.
177. In June 2000, after a significant correction in the value of technology
stocks earlier that year, Microsoft's net physical and financial assets were still
less than ten percent of its market value, and Cisco's physical and financial
assets constituted five percent of its market value. LEV, supra note 18, at 31. In
early August 2000, The Walt Disney Company had a market capitalization of
$117 billion, but only $43.7 billion in balance sheet assets (including $11.3
billion in recognized intangible assets carried on Disney's balance sheet), giving
it some $85 billion in value attributable to intangibles. See BLAIR & WALLMAN,
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In late 2000, even after a major market correction
earlier in the year, stock prices would have needed to
decrease by two-thirds for the gap between market and
book value to disappear. 178 This gap reflects the fact that
intangibles are now a major source of value for many
companies in both the ICT and non-ICT sectors, which gives
evidence of the pervasiveness of intangibles for businesses
today. In addition, intangibles in recent years have accounted for more than seventy percent of the total market
value of companies in a wide range of industries, including
consumer goods, ICT, pharmaceuticals, and entertainment
at different times under varied stock market conditions and
valuations. 179 Other measures may also be used to demonstrate the significance of intangibles under the intangibles
paradigm.180
supra note 159, at 12. For Sprint Corp., the gap in August 2000 was close to $31
billion, with a market capitalization of $60.2 billion and financial statement
assets of $39 billion (including $9.6 billion in recognized intangibles). See id.
Net assets of SAP, the German enterprise resource planning and e-business
software company, were only 4.6 percent of SAP's market value as of December
31, 1999. DAUM, supranote 65, at 5.
178. See BLAIR & WALLMAN, supra note 159, at 12.
179. Intangibles are the predominant source of value for a wide range of
companies. The percentages below represent the percent of total company stock
market value attributable to intangibles based on the company's market value
as of the stated date: The Walt Disney Company (70.9%, September 1998), H.J.
Heinz Company (89.6%, April 1998), Johnson & Johnson (87.9%, December
1998), Merck & Company (93.5%, September 1998), Microsoft Corporation
(97.8%, June 1998), Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) (71.8%,
December 1998), Philip Morris Companies (78.8%, December 1998), Nike, Inc.
(76.0%, May 1998), Proctor & Gamble Company (88.5%, September 1997),
Yahoo! Inc. (98.9%, December 1998). See Smith & Parr, supra note 40, at 12349. Similarly, in 1986, Merck's book value was 12.3% of its market value, while
in 1996, Coca-Cola's book assets were 5% of its market value and Microsoft's
just 6%. In 2001, Cisco's book value was 25% of its market value, while GE's
book assets were 10% of its market value. See Jeremy Galbreath, Twenty-First
Century Management Rules: The Management of Relationships as Intangible
Assets, 40 MGMT. DESIGN 116, 117 (2002).

180. Tobin's q is one such measure. Tobin's q, developed by Nobel prize
winning economist James Tobin, is the ratio of the stock market value of a firm
to the replacement value of the firm's capital assets. As such, it indirectly
measures the rate of return of an asset. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt,
Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation
and Business Performance, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 34 (2000); Hilary Shane &
Mark Klock, The Relation Between Patent Citations and Tobin's Q in the
Semiconductor Industry, 9 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACcT. 131, 133 (1997)

(noting that Tobin's Q determines the relative valuation of tangible and
intangible assets); see also Steven R. Bond & Jason G. Cummins, The Stock
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Underlying the market-to-book gap is the operation of
the intangibles paradigm. Although the market-to-book
ratio suggests that intangibles may be undervalued by
markets, the picture is actually a bit more complex. The
market-to-book gap reflects a persistent failure under the
intangibles paradigm for financial reporting and other
corporate disclosures to represent adequately and consistently the economic reality of business operations under the
intangibles paradigm. In some instances, investments in
intangibles by some companies may be undervalued, but in
other cases such investments may be overvalued. 181 Market
trends may further obscure individual company valuations
as well. The bull market at the end of the 1990s may, for
example, have been associated with markets overvaluing
intangibles, which is likely reflected in the 7.5 market-tobook ratio number in March 2000. The fact that the market
may have overvalued intangibles in aggregate during the
height of the bubble does not, however, obscure the
operation of the intangibles paradigm or the fact that
markets may, in the case of individual companies, either
undervalue or overvalue the contribution of intangibles.
The market-to-book gap does, however, suggest that
existing disclosure standards for intangibles are not
adequate and too often result in distorted and inaccurate
company financial statements and disclosures that do not
match economic reality. 18 2 This ultimately means that
markets and investors may not always have information
that would enable them to value the contribution of intangibles to companies consistently across different companies.
Since one goal of financial statements is to provide for the
fair presentation of financial data that can also be
compared between firms and industries,18 3 the development
of disclosure mechanisms on the financial reporting and

Market and Investment in the New Economy: Some Tangible Facts and
Intangible Fictions, in INTANGIBLE AsSETS 95, 96 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch
Lev eds., 2003).
181. See infra notes 406 to 423 and accompanying text.
182. See Part III.A-B and accompanying text.
183. See SHORTER, supra note 46, at 2 ("GAAP are guidelines and rules for
use by accountants in preparing financial statements, that have evolved over
years, and are designed to help ensure that financial data are presented fairly
and are comparable from firm to firm and from industry to industry.").
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securities regulation fronts are important avenues 4for
dealing with the operation of the intangibles paradigm.18
As a result of the intangibles paradigm shift, financial
statements have become less informative from an accounting and economic perspective. 8 5 One example of this is the
diminishing extent to which balance sheets describe the
sources from which companies derive value. If balance
sheets reflected the entire value attributed to companies by
financial markets, the book value of assets should not
diverge significantly from the company's stock market
value. In a strongly efficient stock market, the market
value of a company always equals its fundamental value.i 88 67
Although stock markets are not strongly efficient,
improving market efficiency has become an important
aspect of market regulation, and the extent to which the
market value of a company equals its fundamental
economic value is an indicator of the manner in which the
market responds to information concerning a company. 88
184. See infra notes 392 to 423 and accompanying text.
185. See LEV, supra note 18, at 99-101; Caflibano et al., supra note 41, at 5;
Lev & Zarowin, supra note 121, at 2 ("We validate our conjecture that business
change is an important factor responsible for the deterioration in the
informativeness of financial information, by first providing evidence that the
rate of change experienced by U.S. business enterprises has increased over the
last 20 years, and then by linking the increased rate of change with the decline
in the usefulness of financial information.").
186. Bond & Cummins, supra note 180, at 96.
187. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 797 (1985) ("[A]
substantial body of empirical work questions whether even the most welldeveloped capital markets are efficient.") (citations omitted); Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing
and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 709 n.1 (1988) ("Capital
markets are described as 'efficient' when stock prices fully reflect all available
information relevant to their values.") (citations omitted); Werner F.M. De
Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and
Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557, 579 (1987) (finding evidence consistent
with the behavioral view that investors overreact to short-term earnings
movements).
188. Stout, supra note 187, at 621 ('"The ECMH addresses only how quickly
stock market prices react to new information. One could imagine other forms of
efficiency that could be desired in securities markets. But no other vision of
efficiency has captured the hearts and minds of the securities culture to the
degree that informational efficiency.") (citations omitted); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
549-50, 643 (1984) (noting the wide acceptance of the efficient capital market
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Further, the extent to which fundamental economic reality
is reflected or not reflected in market valuations can be
closely related to company representations, accounting
presentations, and other information disclosure. The
reasons for the increasing divergence between market
values and book values are rooted in the fact that
accounting treatment for intangible and tangible assets is
significantly
different.1 8 9 The economic
uncertainty
associated with intangibles is also typically greater than for
physical assets. 190 This economic uncertainty is magnified
by the influence of company presentations of financial
results, particularly in the current business milieu in which
intangibles are increasingly predominant. Such presentations take on added significance given the potentially
significant flexibility that companies may have to present
their economic reality. This is particularly true since
existing regulatory structures have not fully adapted to the
economic reality of the knowledge economy.
C. Presentationand Performance:Company Framing
Choices and Audience Impressions
1. Dramaturgical Aspects of Company Presentations.
How businesses present themselves in different contexts is
an important aspect of business behavior and practice.
hypothesis in the legal literature and suggesting "that a continuum of market
mechanisms keyed to the broad or narrow distribution of trading information is
a general analytical tool with value for understanding a wide spectrum both of
markets and of their attendant institutional supports"); Gordon & Kornhauser,
supra note 187, at 762 (noting that the efficient market hypothesis has strongly
influenced legal theory as well as prevailing doctrines and regulations); Lucy F.
Ackert & Brian F. Smith, Stock Price Volatility, Ordinary Dividends, and Other
Cash Flows to Shareholders, 48 J. FIN. 1147, 1147 (1993) (noting that the
simple market efficiency hypothesis "implies that movements in stock prices are
either due to changes in the discount rate or or to new information concerning
cash flows, and at any point in time stock prices reflect all available
information"); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (reviewing theoretical and
empirical work on the efficient markets hypothesis and discussing the weak,
semi-strong and strong forms of adjustment to relevant information).
189. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text; LEV, supra note 18, at 79103.
190. See LEV, supranote 18, at 41-42, 82; Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, Intangible
Assets: Measurement, Drivers, Usefulness 2-3 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 2003-05, 2001), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-blev/intangibleassets.doc.
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Business presentations are often heavily context dependent.
In fact, presentation opportunities represent points at
which a company may demonstrate performance variations
in its choice of the type, nature, and content of its discourse
and disclosure. Performance in the business context is
reflected in the activity of individual representatives who
speak on behalf of a business, as well as documents issued
on behalf of, or with respect to, the company. Such
performances may be seen as encompassing specific
contexts of activity with respect to a company that occur
"during a period marked by ... continuous presence before
a particular set of observers and which has some influence
on the observers."' 191
The individuals who comprise management are
typically the principal actors involved in such performances, reflecting the established social roles that are
expected in the business context. Such established social
roles would include, among others, Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and other
management positions. Although these roles are certainly
not identical from company to company, individuals in
these roles do have some ability to define their roles in the
course of performance. Despite such potential differences in
how individuals fulfill these roles, general societal and
business expectations do typically exist with respect to the
nature of these roles and their responsibilities. In addition,
individuals in these roles may have a variety of "fronts"
from which to choose. 192
Such performance choices exist on a different plane
than is typically envisaged in discussions about compliance
with securities disclosure requirements or accounting rules.
At one end of the spectrum, however, when such
performances constitute fraud or a material misrepresentation, they implicate potentially serious legal and accounting
compliance concerns. Within this spectrum, as a result of
the available range of choices, many modes of presentation
potentially exist that a company might use to represent
economic reality within the context of existing accounting
191. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF THE SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE

22 (1959).
192. See id.; see also infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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and legal disclosure requirements. 193 How and in what
manner a company frames itself within such rules and
regulations is thus important and potentially flexible
depending on the context of presentation. Such framing is
most evident in the choices companies make about how to
present themselves both internally and externally.
The individuals in the management of a start-up
company seeking venture capital financing, for example,
may use different discourse when speaking with prospective
venture capital investors than they might use with regard
to existing investors or even potential strategic partners.
This discourse may reflect the selection of a "front" or the
"part of the individual's performance which regularly
functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the
situation for those who observe the performance."' 194 This
reflects the fact that businesses often target such
presentations or performances to suit the nature and
expectations of the anticipated audience. As such, business
presentations have dramaturgical elements. Moreover, such
presentations are ones in which
the individual infuses his activity with signs which dramatically
heighten and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise
remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual's activity is to
become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that
it will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey.195

For example, in the case of a representative of a business
giving a presentation, the business person, by operating in
a certain manner or mode, seeks to create a particular
impression on the part of the audience. 196 The creation of
such impressions is an important aspect of the process by

193. Cf. RICHARD BAUMAN, A WORLD OF OTHERS' WORDS: CROSS-CULTURAL

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEXTUALITY 124 (2004) ("[F]or the productiveness of

considering performance not as any doing of an oral literary text, but as one of
the range of interactionally defined presentation modes, or frames, which may
be more or less functionally dominant in any act of spoken communication or at
any given point during its course.").
194. GOFFMAN, supra note 191, at 22.
195. Id. at 30.
196. See id. at 17.
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which corporations communicate in interpretable
ways with
197
various audiences in varied contexts.
The impression that the person making the
presentation seeks to evoke may have a significant
influence on how the presentation is received by the
audience. By initiating a presentation seeking a particular
impression, the presenter thus "implicitly requests his
observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered
before them."'198 Face-to-face meetings and other contexts in
which companies make presentations suggest that contextually determined self-presentation is an important factor
in how businesses create a particular impression of the
company and its operations. Such business presentations
highlight the fact that businesses choose elements for a
particular characterization of the company in a particular
context from a potentially wide range of choices. The
dramaturgical aspects of company presentations thus
suggest that companies have some ability to define the
context within which they represent a particular economic
reality. Such framing may have a potentially significant
impact on how a particular representation of reality is both
received and accepted.
2. Variations in Performance:The Implications of
PresentationChoices
Company presentations
may exhibit significant
variations in both the style and content of performance in
different contexts. Companies may, for instance, have
characteristic internal presentations to employees or senior
managers, for example, which may differ from external
presentations, as well as varying presentations among
different internal constituencies. The documentary film
Startup.com, 199 for example, illustrates this point clearly.
This film contrasts internal presentations to employees by
the CEO of GovWorks.com, the Internet startup depicted in
the film, with meetings with external audiences,
particularly venture capital firms. It also illustrates some
197. See BAUMAN, supra note 193, at 123 (noting that performance rests on
two dimensions of communicative competence: "knowledge and the ability to
communicate in socially appropriate and interpretable ways").
198. GOFFMAN, supra note 191, at 17.

199. See STARTUP.COM (Artisan Entertainment 2001).
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potential differences in presentation between internal
company-wide meetings and internal meetings of senior
managers.
It is thus quite typical for senior management and
those empowered to speak on behalf of companies to
present entirely different portraits of the company for
varied purposes and in different contexts. 20 0 Such
variations in presentations do not necessarily involve
deception, but may merely involve selective emphasis of
relevant factors relating to a particular economic or
business reality targeted to a particular audience or forum.
In addition to face-to-face meetings, businesses also engage
in such presentations to varied audiences through the
medium of business documents such as annual reports,
required securities disclosure, and by means of financial
statements. Businesses also give presentations in other
contexts including web casts, newspaper and television
coverage, and analyst calls, for example.
Legal requirements regarding company disclosures
imposed by the SEC may place limitations on a company's
ability to engage in differential presentations for different
audiences. Disclosures, particularly for companies subject
to SEC periodic reporting requirements, could potentially
subject a company to liability under securities laws that
incorporate GAAP accounting standards that govern how
20 1
particular transactions may be measured and reported.
The recent SEC Regulation FD is an explicit recognition of
the fact that businesses may make different presentations
and may disclose different information to different
audiences. Regulation FD, which became effective in
October 2000, addresses selective disclosure by companies
200. Different books for book and tax purposes are one example of this
phenomenon. See e.g., Luppino, supra note 100 (discussing divergent tax and
accounting treatment of synthetic leases); see also supra notes 100 to 111 and
accompanying text.
201. The Exchange Act, for example, imposes periodic reporting
requirements on companies with securities registered under the Exchange Act
(e.g., Reports on Form 10-K and Reports on Form 10-Q). 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2003).
The Exchange Act and rules promulgated under the Exchange Act also contain
anti-fraud provisions that govern disclosures made by all companies in the
course of selling securities. See Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005)
(imposing securities law liabilities for any untrue statement or omission of a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading).
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to analysts. 202 Regulation FD provides that companies
disclosing material nonpublic information to securities
market professionals (e.g., analysts) must also make public
disclosure of such information. 20 3 Regulation FD was
proposed by the SEC as a result of a concern about selective
disclosure of certain information to institutional investors
such information was disclosed to the
and analysts before
20 4
general public.
Rules governing disclosures do not, however, fully
address the phenomenon of contextual framing that may
create a particular impression within which company
representations of economic reality may be received and
accepted. As a result, although guidelines, primarily in the
form of SEC rules and regulations such as Regulation FD,
exist with respect to disclosure in general, companies have
flexibility particularly in face-to-face presentations as well
as in written documents. Business documents, for example,
are not all identical, and different companies clearly have
different styles of presentation.
The styles of presentation for a particular company may
change over time as a reflection of changing business
strategy, changing external conditions, or other factors. It is
not at all uncommon, for example, for a new CEO coming to
a company to make changes in business strategy from prior
management. 205 The 2004 selection of a new CEO at Delta
underscores how this process may occur. The new CEO of
Delta presented himself as a change in direction from prior
202. Regulation FD, 17 CFR § 243.100-243.103 (2005); Final Rule, Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 2000 SEC
LEXIS 1672 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Regulation FD Final Release].
203. Regulation FD Final Release, supra note 202, at *2 ("Regulation FD
(Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective
disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its
behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons
...it must make public disclosure of that information.").
204. Regulation FD, Proposed Rule, Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7787, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2696 (Dec. 20,
1999), at *4 ("Although analysts play an important role in gathering and
analyzing information, and disseminating their analysis to investors, allowing
issuers to disclose material information selectively to analysts is [not] in the
best interests of investors or the securities markets generally. All investors
should have access ...

at the same time.").

205. See infra notes 232 to 237 and accompanying text for a discussion of
changing business strategy at IBM.
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management, despite the fact that he served as a member
of the Delta board of directors for seventeen years prior to
his selection as CEO. 206 Such strategic changes are often
underscored by how new management chooses to present
the company and its business strategy face-to-face and in
other contexts of performance. This presentation process
essentially entails framing the company within the broader
business context.
The shift to the intangibles paradigm at times reveals a
sharp delineation in the content of company selfpresentations as companies seek to characterize economic
reality and their business strategies as incorporating
intangibles and existing within what might be termed
intangibles paradigm discourse. The primary audience for
such presentations is financial markets and market
participants such as investment managers, investment
bankers, analysts, and others. The Internet bubble in the
stock market in the late 1990s also caused a great deal of
media attention to be207
directed toward business, economic,
and financial matters.
The proliferation of media coverage and advertising
concerning the economy, stock market, business, and
specific companies indicates a broadening of the potential
audiences to which businesses might direct their
presentations. 208 Expanding stock ownership has also
206. See Evan Perez, Flight Upgrade: With Delta Reeling, Chief Plans
Unusual Bet on Premium Routes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at Al (noting that
new Delta CEO "in talks with the rank and file . . . has criticized prior
management's mistakes and presented himself as a sharp departure, despite
having been a Delta director for the past 17 years," and commenting that
"[p]erhaps Mr. Grinstein's most remarkable achievement has been to convince
many employees that he represents a clear departure from prior management no small feat given his many years as a powerful board member").
207. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor,
15 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 41 (2001) (noting that the Internet is changing how
information is being distributed to investors and the ways investors can act on
such information); Angel Arrese & Mercedes Medina, Competition Between New
and Old Media in Economic and Financial News Markets 6 (University of
Navarra, Working Paper), available at http://www.tukkk.fi/mediagroup/
5WMEC%2520PAPERS/Arrese%2520%26%252OMedina.pdf
(analyzing the
changing competitive environment of the economic and financial news sector
and noting the renewed preeminence of economic, business and financial
information since the 1990s).
208. Mike Emmison, The Economy: Its Emergence in Media Discourse, in
LANGUAGE, IMAGE, MEDIA 139, 145-50, 155 (Howard Davis & Paul Walton eds.,
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increased the size of the potential audience for such
presentations. 209 This expansion in both financial media
coverage and the audience receiving such news was
particularly evident during the Internet bubble when
technology analysts such as Mary Meeker and Henry
Blodgett received extensive media attention. 210 Significant
media attention was also directed toward companies
themselves, including startups, many of which had no track
record and limited operations. In the film Startup.com, for
example, the CEO of the company made multiple media
appearances, which presented
additional opportunities for
211
framing the company.
As a result of the proliferation of business and financial
media coverage through traditional old media sources and
new avenues such as the Internet, the audience that
businesses might reach through such presentations is
increasingly expanding to include a broader segment of the
general public. 212 This broadening media attention provides
1983) (noting that the category "the economy" can be seen as part of a wider
variety of economic discourse that has changed over time); Richard Parker, The
Revolution in America's FinancialIndustry: How Well Is the Press Covering the
Story? Money, Markets and the News: Monograph 3, The Joan Shorenstein
Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University (1999), available at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edulshorenstein/ResearchPublications/Reports/Parkerpaperfinal.PDF
(discussing the framing and presentation of news about the financial services
industry).
209. Bill Saporito, The Business Century: How the Economy Became Hot
News in the Last 100 Years, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 48-51,
available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/99/2fbusiness.asp
(discussing how
expanding stock ownership increased the demand for financial reporting and
financial information).
210. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Enron's Collapse: The Analyst, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2002, at C8; Landon Thomas, Jr., As Technology Stocks Climb, It Starts
to Feel Like the 90's All Over Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at C1.
211. See STARTUP.COM, supra note 199.
212. Enrique Dans, Internet Newspapers. Are Some More Equal Than
Others?, 2 INT'L J. MEDIA MGMT. 4, 4 (2000) available at http://www.media
journal.org/modules/pub/download.php?id=mediajournal-69&user=&pass
(discussing the expansion of news available on the Internet and the consumer
response to Internet news); Andy Serwer, I Want My CNBC, FORTUNE, May 24,
1999, at 146; Richard Tomlinson, There's an All.Out War to Report on Our
Financial Times, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2000, at 72 (discussing the FinancialTimes
expansion to the U.S. market and the expansion of financial media coverage);
Arrese & Medina, supra note 207, at 6-12 (noting that trends in the media
world led to new stardom for economic and financial news in broadcasting and
electronic media, evident, for example, in the emergence of channels specialized
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additional opportunities for framing. It also further
reinforces the multicontextual aspects of business
presentations and framing that reproduce certain aspects of
business worldview and practice that have emerged or
intensified under the intangibles paradigm.
D. A New Business Paradigm:Business Worldview and
Practice under the IntangiblesParadigm
1. The Intangibles ParadigmShift
a) Paradigm Shifts from a Kuhnian Perspective. The
intangibles paradigm shift is a profoundly important
reorientation reflective of the post-industrial context within
which businesses operate. 213 This fundamental paradigm
shift involves changes in business practice and
worldview. 214 Thomas Kuhn's model of normal science and
the scientific revolutions associated with paradigm shifts in
the sciences can be used to illuminate the processes that
have characterized the shift to an intangibles paradigm in
business. 215 From Kuhn's perspective, the history of science
in economic and financial news such as FNN, CNBC, CNN/n, Bloomberg
Information Television and European Business News and websites devoted to
economic and financial issues); The Pew Research Center For The People & The
Press, Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience (2000), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=36 (noting that the rapid
emergence of the Internet as a news source that is attracting key segments of
the national audience).
213. See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical
Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 356
(1990) (commenting on "the emergence . . . of a new techno-economic regime

based on computer and communications innovation [that is] supplanting the
mature, ossified Fordist regime of mass production").
214. Paul B. Westberg & Patrick H. Sullivan, In Search of a Paradigm, in
PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION

59, 59-75 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998) (discussing generally the Kuhnian
paradigm concept in relation to knowledge companies); The European
Commission, supra note 161, at § 1 (discussing structural shift in mode of
corporate wealth creation to knowledge based model whose defining trend is
shift from tangible to intangible factors of production, which has led to a shift in
the asset base of companies and societies).
215. See generally KUHN, supra note 19; see also Thomas S. Kuhn,
Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 231,

266-77 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970) (discussing the multiple
meanings of paradigm in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).
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can be described as a process of destructive-constructive
paradigm changes involving periods of normal science
characterized by widespread acceptance of a certain
paradigm or accepted model or pattern. 216 Such paradigms,
however, typically do not account for all aspects of the
observable phenomena that they seek to explain, giving rise
to what Kuhn calls "anomalies."' 2 17 Consequently, in such
anomalies are the seeds of the crises leading to scientific
revolutions that Kuhn sees as typifying the shift to new
paradigms. Kuhn theorizes that certain scientists, typically
those who are either younger or new to a given field and
thus less permeated with ideas linked with current
paradigms, 218 are associated with initiating paradigm shifts
through their examination of and attempts to explain
anomalies in existing paradigms. Because existing
paradigms do not explain such anomalous characteristics,
new paradigms develop to explicate what could not be
explained under the old paradigm. 219 Such new paradigms
also contain within them the anomalous characteristics
that may be the basis for future paradigm shifts.
b) The Metaphysical and Sociological Aspects of the
Intangibles Paradigm.In contrast to paradigm shifts in the
scientific community, which are precipitated by changing
perceptions of external conditions, the shift to an
intangibles paradigm in the business context is probably
best seen as precipitated by changes in external conditions
and underlying economic reality. This is particularly true
with respect to the competitive environment in which
businesses operate and the changes associated with

216. KUHN, supra note 19, at 23, 66, 96 (describing normal science research
as a cumulative process).

217. Id. at 17-18, 64 (noting that a paradigm is a theory that is better than
its competitors, but that not necessarily and "in fact never does, explain all the
facts with which it can be confronted," and that and an anomaly "opens a period
in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous has
become the anticipated.").
218. Id. at 90. ("Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental
inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the
field whose paradigm they change.").
219. Id. at 92.
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globalization, deregulation and increased competition. 220
Although Kuhn uses the term paradigm in many different
senses in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, his uses of
paradigm as metaphysical and sociological constructions
are most relevant to consideration of the intangibles
paradigm in business. 221 The term paradigm as used herein
does not in any way imply an acceptance of the entirety of
Kuhn's model of the development of normal science in a
business context. At the core of the intangibles paradigm,
however, is a fundamental change in the nature of and
perceptions of the milieu in which businesses operate in the
post-industrial era knowledge economy. These changing
perceptions have been closely associated with changing
external conditions, and involve both metaphysical aspects
relating to worldview and sociological aspects evident in
changing business practice. Such changes have been
accompanied by transformations in discussions about
business organization and practice. One example of this is
changes in the actual language companies use to describe
their incorporation of intangibles as well as company
framing and descriptions of changes in business practices
associated with the intangibles paradigm shift.
The metaphysical aspects of the shift to an intangibles
paradigm are illustrated by changing
worldviews
concerning the sources from which businesses derive their
primary value. 222 One important reflection of the
development of the intangibles paradigm worldview is the
220. LEV, supra note 18, at 8-13 (noting that globalization, deregulation and
increased competition are factors in the increasing predominance of
intangibles).
221. Margaret Masterman and George Ritzer, in particular, have discussed
Kuhn's uses of the term paradigm and classified his uses into broad categories,
the most significant of which are the metaphysical and sociological aspects of a
paradigm. The terms metaphysical and sociological paradigm come from
Margaret Masterman's comprehensive and thorough discussion of the nature
and uses of Thomas Kuhn's paradigm concept. See Margaret Masterman, The
Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 59, 65
(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970) (distinguishing between metaphysical paradigms, sociological paradigms and construct paradigms); see also
GEORGE RITZER, SOCIOLOGY: A MULTIPLE PARADIGM SCIENCE 4-6 (rev. ed. 1980)

(subsuming three types of paradigm identified by Masterman under rubric of
metaphysical paradigm).
222. The market-to-book gap, for example, gives evidence of the
fundamental changes in sources of value for businesses. See supra notes 165 to
190 and accompanying text.
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proliferating strategic intellectual property business
literature that has developed under the intangibles
paradigm. This literature includes a myriad of books and
articles that discuss the importance of intangibles for
223
business from a strategic and value creation perspective.
This literature reflects the strategic importance of intangible assets to businesses. It is likely both a factor in and
illustrative of the increasing recognition of the significance
of intangibles and value attributed to intangibles by
markets and firms. This literature thus plays a role
comparable to that attributed to textbooks, lectures, and
laboratory exercises by Kuhn in tending to
reveal the
224
nature and contents of underlying paradigms.
This increasing recognition about the economic reality
of intangibles for businesses reflects the extent to which the
shift to an intangibles paradigm represents a change in

223. The core works in this body of work were originally published in the
1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., JULIE L. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN
THE BOARDROOM (2001); ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, STRATEGY MAPS:
CONVERTING INTANGIBLE ASSETS INTO TANGIBLE OUTCOMES (2004); KEVIN G.
RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN

VALUE OF PATENTS (2000); Leif Edvinsson, Managing Intellectual Capital at
Skandia, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM

INNOVATION 279-83 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Suzanne Harrison & Kevin
Rivette, The IP Portfolio as a Competitive Tool, in PROFITING FROM
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 119-28 (Patrick H.

Sullivan ed., 1998); Kari Laento, Intellectual Asset Management at Nestle, in
PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION

242-52 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Lori Morrison & Paul Germeraad,
Intellectual Asset Management at Avery Dennison, in PROFITING FROM
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 221-41 (Patrick H.
Sullivan ed., 1998); Gordon Petrash, Intellectual Asset Management at Dow
Chemical, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM

INNOVATION 205-20 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Patrick H. Sullivan,
Extracting Value from Intellectual Assets, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 173-85 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed.,

1998); Patrick H. Sullivan, Extracting Value from Intellectual Property, in
PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION

103-18 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline,
Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. Bus. REV. 8 (Jan.-Feb.
2000). In these pieces, varied terminology is used to describe intangible assets
in the accounting and business literature. Terms used include intellectual
capital, knowledge assets, and human capital. See LEV, supra note 18, at 5
(discussing terminology); Sullivan, supra note 166, at 5 (discussing
terminology); Westberg & Sullivan, supra note 214, at 63 (giving a timeline of
events in the intellectual capital business strategy movement).
224. See KUHN, supra note 19, at 43.
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worldview or a "new way of seeing. ' 225 This new worldview
is partly driven by the fact that intangibles are
fundamentally different from tangible assets, particularly
in relation to boundaries. In the tangible asset context,
boundaries are easier to draw because the tangibility of a
product with a physical embodiment makes establishment
and reinforcement
of boundaries around the product more
clear-cut. 226
The sociological and metaphysical aspects of the
intangibles paradigm shift are clearly interrelated. It is,
however, useful to separate them conceptually, which can
contribute to understanding the dynamic processes by
which the shift to an intangibles paradigm has occurred.
Particularly relevant here is how worldview changes have
translated sociologically into changes in the behavior of
individuals and firms. Under the intangibles paradigm, a
fundamental change in sociological orientation has also
occurred with respect to how many companies operate on a
day-to-day basis. 227 The organizational practices evident in
Cisco's CCO, CEC, and VFO reflect these changes. 228 On a
sociological level, the intangibles paradigm shift is most
evident in the changes in organizational structure and
229
business practices associated with the intangibles era.
Although the intangibles paradigm is broader and includes
changes other than those connected to the ICT economy,
many of these sociological changes involve the incorporation
of intangibles, including ICTs, into companies and insertion
of companies in the context of the ICT economy. Cisco and
Wal-Mart are examples of companies who have successfully
done this and who are at the forefront of incorporating

225. See id. at 117-21 (noting that textbooks, lectures and laboratory
exercises reveal the nature and contents of underlying paradigms); see also
Masterman, supra note 219, at 76-79; RITZER, supra note 221, at 4-10.
226. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 19-58 (discussing
intangibles and boundaries).
227. See e.g., DAUM, supra note 65. KUHN, supra note 19, at 10, 23 (noting
that a paradigm shift is analogous to a concrete set of habits and "like an
accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further
articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions"); see also
Ritzer, supra note 221, at 4-6.
228. See supra notes 138 to 156 and accompanying text.
229 See KUHN, supra note 19, at 18 (recognizing that the emergence of a
new paradigm affects organizational structures).
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intangibles
and ICTs into their business organization and
230
practices.
c) Business Representations, Corporate Documents,
and the Intangibles Paradigm. Both metaphysical and
sociological components of the intangibles paradigm shift
are evident in the framing in corporate documents such as
annual reports that position companies and describe corporate strategies and actions taken. A marked shift began at
the end of the twentieth century in how companies describe
themselves in terms of the conceptualization and utilization
of intangible resources and other factors associated with the
intangibles paradigm.
Corporate annual reports are useful documents for
assessing the impact of the intangibles paradigm on
business worldview and practice. They also provide evidence for the penetration of intangibles paradigm discourse
in the business context by framing and positioning companies in two ways. Companies position themselves within the
intangibles paradigm and discuss the role and integration
of intangibles and ICTs within companies. Corporate
annual reports and other documents generated by companies are also instructive in that they reflect a company's
presentation of itself to public markets and investors. 23 1
The proliferation of e-commerce and Internet terminology
in company documents such as annual reports in the late
1990s illustrates this point. My review of company annual
reports suggests that prior to the collapse of the Internet
bubble, a broad range of companies used language in
annual reports and other disclosure documents derived
from and related to the experience of ICT, e-commerce, and
Internet companies. Following the collapse of the Internet
bubble, Internet-related terminology decreased, although
general references to ICTs remained evident. IBM is an
example of a company that used changing discourse and
framing to highlight and sell a new business strategy to
markets that were skeptical about its future. Despite its
extensive patent portfolio and status as a leading
technology company, in 1993, on the arrival of a new CEO,
230. See infra notes 386 to 397 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Wal-Mart and supra notes 138 to 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Cisco.
231. See infra notes 191 to 211 and accompanying text.
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Louis Gerstner, IBM had declining revenues, earnings, and
stock price, 232 reflecting the fact that it was viewed as being
inbred and ingrown. 233 IBM was able to reverse course and
successfully implement new technology strategies. 234 As
part of this process, IBM embedded itself within intangibles
paradigm discourse. The 1994 IBM Annual Report is
particularly notable because it describes 1994 as the year
that the new IBM emerged. 235 In its 1994 Annual Report,
IBM focuses on information technology, noting that
information technology would revolutionize society. 236 The
1994 IBM Annual Report emphasizes placing IBM within
237
the context of what IBM terms the technology revolution.
IBM's use of language in the 1994 Annual Report typifies
intangibles paradigm discourse.
Non-ICT intensive companies also evidence a discourse
that emphasizes the importance of intangibles and ICTs in
general and particular applications of such technologies in
specific business contexts. Wal-Mart reflects this phenomenon. After little mention of intangibles, ICTs or related
terms in Annual Reports since 1970, in the mid-1990s, WalMart began to emphasize the integration of the company
under the intangibles paradigm, and the integration of
intangibles and ICT technologies in the company. The
former is reflected in statements such as "Wal-Mart leads
industry in technology and is not slowing down" and the
latter in statements such as "[w]ith this technology, we're
getting better, quicker and more accurate information to
",238
manage and control every aspect of our business ....
232. DOUG

GARR,

IBM

REDUX:

Louis

GERSTNER

AND

THE

BUSINESS

TURNAROUND OF THE DECADE 19-20 (2000) (noting a plunge in IBM's stock price
of thirty percent between 1990 and 1993 and loss of $6 billion in market
capitalization).
233. In addition, IBM was suffering a liquidity crisis. See Lisa DiCarlo,
Books: How Gerstner Got IBM to Dance, FORBES.COM, Nov. 11, 2002, available
at http://www.forbes.com/2002/11/11/cx-ld_1112gerstner.html.
234. See id.; GARR, supranote 232.
235. Chairman's Letter, IBM ,1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. IBM Annual Reports from 1994 to present are available at
http://www.ibm.com/investor/financials/annualreport.phtml (last visited Apr. 3,
2006).
238. WAL-MART, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 12-13. Wal-Mart annual reports
from 1970 to present are available at http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/
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2. Intangibles ParadigmDiscourse: Strategic Behavior and
the Strategic Intellectual Property Management
Literature
a) Intangibles, Strategic Behaviors, and Business
Transformations. Intangibles paradigm discourse reflects
business practices and strategic behaviors with respect to
intangibles. Intangibles are a major source of value for
companies today in varied business sectors and industries. 239 In addition to discussing how intangibles should be
used strategically and often offensively, 240 the strategic
intellectual property management literature provides
guidance about how companies can assess and measure
structures that best
intangibles and create organizational
241
enable exploitation of intangibles.
One focus of this discussion is how intangibles can be
commoditized or monetized and translated into major
sources of corporate value. 242 This literature is more than a
hypothetical discussion. As Enron and Cisco demonstrate in
quite different ways, the uses of intangibles in actuality and
in representations have real consequences for company
stockholders, company employees, and investors, among
others. The actual incorporation of intangibles into business
operations and practices is often expensive and may also
require significant initial investment. 243 In the case of ICTs,
for example, such incorporation requires significant time for
implementation and training of personnel or customers who
might use ICT products that are integrated into company
processes and standard practices. An actual transition to
wmstores/Mainnews.jsp?pagetype=news&categoryOID=8775&template=Displa
yAllContents.jsp. My review of the company's annual reports found that such
statements became more evident in Wal-Mart Annual Reports after the mid1990s. For further discussion of Wal-Mart and the intangibles paradigm, see
infra notes 386 to 397 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text.
240. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 59-84 (discussing

strategic business uses of intangibles).
241. Id.; see also supra notes 119 and 223.
242. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 57. The
commoditization and monetization of assets was also a core feature of Enron's
strategy. See infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text.
243. See Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 180, at 23; DeLong et al., supra
note 20, at 40.
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intangibles paradigm business practices thus typically
involves far more than discourse. 244 Current disclosure
requirements, however, because they do not adequately
reflect the economic reality of the intangibles paradigm, do
not require provision of information that would enable
better verification of the actual reality of a company's
transition to intangibles paradigm business practices 245
as
opposed to a company's representations of this reality.
The transformations in business practice associated with
the intangibles paradigm also have an external dimension.
As a result, one aspect of the intangibles paradigm and
ICT-era has been the development of at times cartel-like
formations of industries that
have grown in the shadow of
246
intellectual property rules.
Inadequate disclosure standards for intangibles may
also influence company behavior and force companies to use
signaling to convey the value they derive from intangibles
such as patents. 247 This is particularly the case since
current accounting and disclosure standards do not
adequately measure the value of intangibles. Consequently,
as a result of differential accounting treatment of intangibles and the inadequacy of current measurement and
disclosure standards with respect to intangibles, 248 companies with significant amounts of intangible assets "face the
244. See, e.g., Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 180, at 23 (commenting that
investment in information technology often complements organizational
changes in companies, including changes in business processes and work
practices); Lev, supra note 2, at 132; van Ark, supra note 26, at 17 (noting that
successful ICT implementation is facilitated by investments in organizational
capital).
245. See Lev, supra note 6, at 112 (noting the lack of requirement for
meaning disclosure from companies about intangibles).
246. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOs & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM
(2002); Goldfinger, supra note 44, at 210-11 (speaking of coopetition, the
coexistence of competition and cooperation, that is often characteristic under
the intangibles paradigm); Bronwyn H. Hall, Business Method Patents,
Innovation and Policy 11 (Inst. Bus. & Econ. Res., Dept. of Econ., U. Cal.
Berkeley, Paper No. E03-331, 2003), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
iber/econ/E03-331 (noting that the patent system tends to influence industrial
organization).
247. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002)
(framing patent filings as a way of credibly publicizing information); Gideon
Parchamovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(discussing a portfolio theory of patenting).
248. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
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rather formidable task of credibly signaling firm value to
investors and shareholders." 249 This need to signal company
value has influenced strategic behaviors reflected in how
companies talk about and use intangibles. 250 Through
skillful use of intangibles paradigm discourse, some
companies have been able to effectively position themselves
under the intangibles paradigm and achieve significant
increases in market valuations as a consequence. 251
b) Intangibles Paradigm Discourse and Practice at
Enron. Enron's accounting for its Blockbuster venture
demonstrates the use of intangibles paradigm discourse. 252
In July 2000, Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay announced the
formation of a twenty-year deal involving a venture with
Blockbuster Inc. that would allow consumers to have
movies sent via telephone lines to watch on televisions at
home. The partnership was announced with great fanfare
and described as the "ultimate bricks-clicks-and-flicks
strategy." 253 Without Blockbuster's knowledge, within
months of making the deal with Blockbuster, Enron set up
the Braveheart affiliated partnership and obtained a $115.2
million investment in the Braveheart partnership from
CIBC World Markets. In exchange, CIBC received a
promise of future earnings from Enron's share of the
Blockbuster partnership for ten years. 254 Within eight
months of this announcement, the partners had split, with
Enron blaming Blockbuster for not getting big movie
studios to sign licensing deals for the most popular titles. 255
Even though the Braveheart partnership had no
separate staff or operations other than Enron's stake in the
Blockbuster venture, "Enron claimed $110.9 million in
profits from Braveheart in the fourth quarter of 2000 and
249. David S. Gelb & Philip Siegel, Intangible Assets and Corporate
Signaling, 15 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 307, 321 (2000).

250. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 62-8.
251. See id.

252. See Rebecca Smith, Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How
Enron Overplayed its Hand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at Al; see also MCLEAN
& ELKIND, supra note 98, at 291-95 (describing the Braveheart transaction in
detail).
253. See Smith, supra note 252.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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the first quarter of 2001. '' 256 Braveheart was never more
than a pilot project and never had a significant number of
paying customers. 257 When Enron formed Braveheart in
December 2000, it "assigned the partnership a value of
$124.8 million based on its projections of the revenue and
earnings potential of the Blockbuster venture. ' 258 Although
Enron's behavior was at best a serious misrepresentation,
Enron's actions do reveal something about the nature and
flexibility that companies may have in manipulating even
illusory intangibles that is likely not readily available to
them for tangible assets.
In contrast to a tangible asset business model, which
might involve setting up physical retail locations, the
proposed Blockbuster venture was an ICT-focused business
endeavor that included a significant service component. As
such, it illustrates the types of business transactions that
have become typical under the intangibles paradigm. This
combination of an ICT-intensive business transaction with
a significant service component means, however, that far
less about this transaction would likely be disclosed or
verifiable from an accounting perspective than would
typically be the case in a business transaction that involved
physical retail locations. This differential treatment,
combined with the high degree of intangibility associated
with the venture itself, make verification of underlying
economic reality often more difficult in the context of
intangibles paradigm business practices. The types of
unverifiable intangibles evident in the Enron Blockbuster
case make financial statements difficult to audit. 25 9 They
also make it much more difficult for investors to rely upon
financial statement numbers as true measures of the
economic value of an enterprise.
Enron exemplifies how skillful use of a particular
discourse combined with complexity in financial structure
and presentation magnified the accounting haze and
obscured the company's activities in a way that facilitated

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Joshua Ronen, Editorial: Policy Reforms in the Aftermath of
Accounting Scandals, 21 J. ACcT. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 284 (2002).
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fraud. 260 Enron's misrepresentations occurred in a broader
environment in which many who should have examined
Enron's accounting and business practices with greater
care, including analysts and financial reporters, were to a
large extent captive to the impressions that Enron sought
to project. 261 Enron was thus quite effective in representing
itself as a new economy company despite the fact that the
reality of its 262
business practices did not support this
representation.
Enron was not alone in its use of aggressive accounting
practices, although it was atypical in the scope and
dimension of the fraud and misrepresentation involved in
its accounting and representations. 263 During the late
1990s, many companies used aggressive accounting practices, which resulted in an unprecedented number of
financial restatements. 264 Financial restatements occur
when companies acknowledge that prior financial
statements were inaccurate and release
financial statements reflecting the correct numbers. 265
260. In addition to creating extremely complex financial structures, Enron
also used derivatives extensively. This combination made deciphering Enron's
financial statements quite challenging for even the most financially
sophisticated readers. See infra notes 362 to 371 and accompanying text.
261. See Scott Sherman, Enron: Uncovering the Uncovered Story, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 24 available at http://www.cjr.org/
issues/2002/2/enron-sherman. asp (noting that analysts and newspapers such as
the Wall Street Journal,Forbes,Fortune and Worth rushed to embrace Enron in
the late 1990s in "a universe where applause obliterated skepticism").
262. See id. at 27 (noting that reporters and analysts "who plunged into
Enron's finances became instantly suspicious about what they found").
263. See Lawrence Revsine, Enron: Sad but Inevitable, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB.
POL'Y 137, 138 (2002) (characterizing Enron debacle as an extreme example of
"selective financial misrepresentation" that is inevitable in the current financial
reporting environment); George J. Bentson & Al L. Hartgraves, Enron: What
Happened and What We Can Learn From It, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 107
(2002) (outlining Enron's complex financial structures and transactions and
looking at their effects on Enron's financial statements).
264. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 282-285 (2004) (noting
increase in earnings restatements of more than 250% in the five years ending in
2002); GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4; see also infra notes 336 to 347 and
accompanying text.
265. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 1-2 (discussing and analyzing financial
restatements, which the GAO defines as entailing corrections of accounting
irregularities that result in material misstatements of financial results).
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The shift to an intangibles paradigm in both its
metaphysical or worldview and sociological or operational
aspects is a particularly important one from which to
consider the operation of systems of rules that regulate
business behavior. This fundamental paradigm shift is an
important context in which many current ICT-era regulatory debates should be placed. Understanding the core
aspects of this paradigm shift requires looking at the
operation of existing categories and rules under the
intangibles paradigm.
III. THE INTANGIBLES "HAZE": MEASURING AND DESCRIBING
INTANGIBLES
The existing reporting model is not well suited to identifying and
reporting on key value and risk elements inherent in our twentyfirst century knowledge-based economy.., despite the continuing
efforts of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and
SEC to enhance financial reporting, changes in the business
environment-such as the growth in information technology, new
types of relationships between companies, and the increasing use
of complex business transactions and financial instrumentsstatements and pose
constantly threaten the relevance of financial
266
a formidable challenge for standard setters.

A. CapitalAsset or Current Expense?: Differential
Accounting Treatment of Intangibles
The intangibles haze refers to the fact that current
accounting treatment of intangibles often results in
financial statements that are unclear and not reflective of
underlying economic reality. Accounting systems present
companies with a set of guidelines or rules that are then
used to present and explain the company's financial status
267
and transactions for both internal and external purposes.
Depending on the nature of the transaction, a company may
have the ability to frame or engage in self-presentation and
have potentially varying degrees of flexibility in how it

266. Id. at 57.
267. See supra notes 124 to 136 and accompanying text.
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accounts for the transaction. 268 In addition, tax accounting
for the same transaction might be entirely different. 26 9 The
system
fundamental assumption of the current accounting
270
is that assets are often valued at historical cost.
Debates over the accounting treatment of intangibles
271
are certainly not new and date back more than a century.
The appropriate accounting treatment for intangibles
remains a hotly debated topic in FASB, the academic
accounting literature, and the popular press. 272 The focus of
this debate has centered around whether intangibles should
be treated as an operating expense reflected on a company's
income statement or a273capital expense recorded on a
company's balance sheet.
Current U.S. accounting rules actually result in a mix
of market and book (historical) values. 274 Accounting
treatment of company expenses exemplifies this mixture. A
company's expenses may be characterized as operating,
financing, or capital expenses. 275 Operating expenses are
expenses that relate to the current period, such as labor
costs, and are subtracted from revenues during such period
to determine a company's operating earnings. 276 Financing
expenses would include expenses associated with nonequity financings, including as debt, and would include

268. See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 839 (noting that flexibility of
accounting standards means that accounts need only be acceptable, not correct,
which serves the interests of accountants and corporate managers but is
contrary to the needs of investors).
269. See, e.g., Luppino, supra note 100, at 38 (discussing synthetic lease
transaction in which the corporation is a tenant for financial statement
accounting or book purposes, but an owner for tax purposes, which enables
companies to avoid putting debt on their balance sheets for financial statement
purposes); see also supra notes 100 to 111 and accompanying text.
270. See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 815.
271. See SMITH & PARR, supra note 40, at 89 (noting that accountants have
long grappled with how to treat intangibles in financial statements); Cafilibano
et al., supra note 41, at 19.
272. See Chandra Kanodia et al., Should Intangibles Be Measured: What Are
the Economic Trade-Offs?, 42 J. ACcT. RES. 89, 90 (2004).

273. See id.
274. See Cafiibano et al., supra note 41, at 33-35; Wallman, supra note 63.
275. See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 1.
276. See id. at 1-2.
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interest expense, for example. 277 Financing expenses are
278
deducted from operating earnings to estimate net income.
Capital expenses create assets, characterized as assets
because they are expected to generate benefits over
multiple periods. 279 Such assets are placed on the balance
sheet. 280 The value of such capital assets is then written off
or deducted on a company's income statement over their
estimated useful life through depreciation (physical assets)
or amortization (intangibles).281 The remaining net value of
such capital assets remains on a company's balance sheet
as the capital asset is depreciated or amortized. A
distinction exists generally between treatment of expenses
relating to investments in intangibles as opposed to
tangible items. Intangible expenses are largely operating
expenses while tangible expenses are to a far greater extent
treated as capital expenses. 28 2 As a result, in the case of
intangibles, even expenses that are expected to generate
benefits over multiple periods are often28treated
as operating
3
expenses rather than capital expenses.
In the realm of accounting treatment of intangibles,
however, a further distinction exists between treatment of
internally generated intangibles and purchased intangibles. 28 4 Purchased intangibles such as those acquired from a
target company in a merger or acquisition, for example, are

277. See id.
278. Id. at 2.
279. HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 50 (noting that assets represent "probable
future, measurable economic benefits which the reporting entity has acquired
through a current or past transaction."); Carney, supra note 12, at 11 (noting
that assets are things owned by a business that only include "probable future
economic benefits owned or controlled by the business, that are obtained in a
'transaction' to which accountants can attach a price").
280. CARNEY, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that a balance sheet "reflects the
firm's ownership of assets, and the claims against them, on a stated date").
281. Id. at 1-2, 4.
282. See LEV, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that tangible resources are
considered assets while the intangibles are typically expensed).
283. See infra note 288 and accompanying text; HAWKINS, supra note 12, at
591 (noting that due to conservatism in application of accounting principles,
intangible asset costs are typically written off as incurred, or if capitalized,
amortized over a relatively short time period).
284. See Kanodia et al., supra note 272, at 90.
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capitalized and placed on a company's balance sheet. 28 5 In
contrast, most internally generated intangibles are
expensed and appear on a company's income statement as
operating expenses. 286 Examples of internally generated
intangibles would include knowledge generated from a
company's research and development, which for many ICToriented and biotechnology companies represents the vast
majority of the company's value. Such internally generated
intangible expenses are typically expensed, which means
that they are essentially treated in the same manner as
overhead expenses such as salary, for example, and
reported as an expense on the company's income statement
typically during the year in which the expenditure occurs.
The company's net income or profit during the year in
which this deduction occurs would then be reduced to
reflect this expenditure. Yet other internally generated
intangibles are not separately identified in financial
statements at all, but are also treated as operating
expenses. 28 7 The differential treatment of purchased and
internally generated intangibles means that the same
intangible resource might receive different accounting
treatment depending on whether a company purchased it or
developed it internally.
Consequently, U.S. GAAP accounting does not
generally permit companies to capitalize intangibles and
place them on the company's balance sheet unless the
intangibles are purchased intangibles. 288 As a result, GAAP
285. See BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, Statement of Accounting Standards No.

141
47-51 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001) [hereinafter FASB 141]
(discussing appropriate accounting treatment for intangible assets in a merger
or acquisition context).
286. See Kanodia et al., supra note 272, at 90.
287. See id.
288. For an overview of the rules and principles relevant to the accounting
treatment of intangible assets, see GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS,,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142
9-10 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2001) [hereinafter FASB 142] (discussing accounting treatment
of goodwill and intangibles generally); FASB 141, supra note 285, at
39,47,
ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 2 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974)
(requiring expensing of most research and development costs); see also Shyam
Vallabhajosyula, Appendix A: Accounting Rules and Regulations for Intangibles,
in LEV, supra note 18, at 135-54 (discussing INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Opinion No. 17
(Accounting Practices Bd. 1970)), which FASB 142 superseded, but which
contained an essentially similar requirement with respect to expensing of
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would typically require that a company capitalize purchases
of computer hardware and certain types of software
developed internally, but would have the company expense
the other costs such as computer installation, business
process development, and investments in associated intangibles. 28 9 Even when GAAP permits capitalization of
intangibles, 290 companies do not for the most part capitalize
intangibles unless the intangibles are being acquired in a
merger or acquisition context. 291 Since intangibles are in
most cases not capitalized, the assets that are capitalized
and that end up on a company's balance sheet are typically
the company's tangible assets, such as
the computer
292
hardware in the example discussed above.
This differential treatment of tangible assets and
intangibles is significant for several reasons. It tends to
result in distortions of reported financial statements
because such financial statements do not accurately reflect
the true economic value of many business enterprises. This
is one reason a gap may arise between the market value of
a company and the book value of the company's assets as
reported on a company's balance sheet. 293 Measures of a
internally developed intangibles) [hereinafter Vallabhajosyula]; HAWKINS, supra
note 12, at 591 (noting that acquired intangibles are capitalized and amortized
over two or more periods, while internally developed intangibles are typically
expensed as incurred, rather than capitalized). The U.S. treatment of
intangibles may be contrasted with the European standard evident in IAS No.
38, which has a different standard for the capitalization of intangibles, and
which permits recognition of internally generated intangibles in certain limited
circumstances. See IAS 38, supra note 41.
289. Shinkyu Yang & Erik Brynjolfsson, Intangible Assets and Growth
Accounting: Evidence from Computer Investments 3 (Ctr. for eBusiness, Mass.
Inst. of Tech., Paper No. 136, 2001), available at http://ebusiness.mit.edu/
research/papers/136%20erikb,%20Intangible%20assets.pdf.
290. Under FASB rules, companies are required to but rarely capitalize
certain software development costs. See ACCOUNTING FOR THE COSTS OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE TO BE SOLD, LEASED, OR OTHERWISE MARKETED, Statement

of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 86 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985); see
also Vallabhajosyula, supra note 288, at 137-38.
291. In a merger or acquisition context, the difference between the amount
the acquiring company pays for the acquired company and the book value of the
acquired company's assets would be recorded on the acquiring company's
balance sheet as goodwill. See FASB 141, supranote 285, at 43.
292. See LEV, supra note 18, at 79-103.
293. See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying
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company's performance will then also be distorted, 294 which
may influence measures of corporate performance such as
earnings per share, return on assets, and return on
income. 295 The degree and direction of these inaccuracies
will depend on the type of company and nature of the
company's business. 296 Current accounting treatment of
intangibles results, for example, in the characterization of
research and development expenditures as operating
expenses, which generally lowers operating income and net
income. 297 In firms where research and development expenses have increased rapidly over time, treating expenses
associated with intangibles in a similar fashion to tangible
expenditures would result in reclassification of operating
expenses as capital expenses, which would decrease
operating expenses, thus increasing operating income and
likely causing return on capital to increase. 298 In contrast,
in mature firms with stable research and development
expenses, the return on capital may decrease with299 the
reclassification of research and development expenses.
The influence of accounting treatment on measures of
company performance is often particularly significant for
companies in the ICT sector because their relative expenditures on intangibles are often higher. As a result of differential treatment of tangible and intangible resources, the true
role of intangibles for businesses today far too often
remains ill-defined and hazy and, even more importantly,
not transparent. 300

294. Such measures of performance would include the return on equity,
return on assets and net income. See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see also infra
notes 295 to 297 and accompanying text.
295. See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 830, ("All costs of internal R&D are to
be treated as a current expense rather than treated as an investment, like
buying an asset. For this reason, as discussed above, a high-tech company
shows few assets and can look like it is losing money even if it is doing quite
well.").
296. See Lev, supra note 169, at 18.
297. Damodaran, supra note 168, at 4, 21.
298. Id. at 23.
299. Id.
300. See Lev, supranote 18, at 37-42, 89-90.
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B. Accounting Systems and Information:Disclosureand
Decision Making Under the Intangibles Paradigm
A major purpose of financial accounting systems is
provision of information that can be used to make
decisions. 301 These systems, for example, constitute major
sources of information for investors,30 2 as well as for
internal decision making purposes. Investors may look at
company ratios and performance measures such as return
on assets, return on equity or earnings measures, to make a
determination as to whether to undertake or maintain an
existing investment in a particular company.
The rise of intangibles has highlighted potential
deficiencies in existing accounting rules as is evident in the
fact that U.S. GAAP has essentially not fully confronted the
reality of this new paradigm. 303 This failure to come to
terms may have been a factor in recent prominent corporate
scandals. 304 A common backdrop to these scandals was a
business environment where companies were able to
commit fraud by taking advantage of the fact that existing
accounting and disclosure rules do not adequately reflect
the reality of business practices today, particularly with
regard to the role now played by intangibles in such
practices. The ability of such companies to promote inaccurate representations of economic reality and inflate
financial results is in no small part related to gaps in
current
accounting
treatment
of 305and
disclosure
intangibles.
to
respect
with
requirements
The systematic distortions in accounting measures and
disclosure that are characteristic under the intangibles
301. Caffibano et al., supra note 41, at 4; see also Johnson & Kaplan, supra
note 112, at 175-77 (noting that in contrast to nineteenth and early twentieth
century, when accounting innovations were initiated by industrialists and
practitioners, writing in management accounting since 1920 has been
dominated by academics emphasizing simple decision-making models in highly
simplified forms).
302. Caffibano et al., supra note 41, at 4.
303. See Wallman, supra note 63.
304. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915
(2003) (discussing corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and
Qwest).
305. See infra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of Enron.
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paradigm can influence investment and managerial
decisions. 306 For example, the fact that accounting systems
do not adequately measure the economic reality and the
role played by intangibles is a critical factor in the marketto-book gap. In the absence of other adequate explanations,
market participants may tend to perceive this gap as
reflective of the value of intangibles, which may or may not
be an accurate assessment of underlying economic reality.
Distorted accounting combined with accounting fixation
mean that persons looking at and making decisions on the
basis of distorted financial statements, even those with an
understanding of accounting, may not see through the
skewed numbers to the underlying economic reality. 307 This
is problematic because it leaves more room for companies
themselves to use framing and presentation to present
alternate representations of reality that are not contradicted by measures that can be made using existing
reporting and disclosure standards. This gives companies
far more leeway than might exist with respect to tangibles
paradigm business practices to fill this gap and influence
how this gap might be perceived. 308 Financial statements
actually rooted in and more accurately representative of the
underlying economic reality of the company are critical to
the operation of regulatory structures that govern company
behavior under the intangibles paradigm.
The inherent distortions in current accounting
measures of intangibles are magnified by generally

306. Baruch Lev, Bharat Sarath & Theodore Sougiannis, R&D Reporting
Biases And Their Consequences 4 (Dec. 1999), available at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/-blev/knowledge&shareholdervalue.doc.
307. See Joan L. Luft & Michael D. Shields, Why Does Fixation Persist, in
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 415-46 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003)
(discussing the influence of learning on individuals' judgments about the effects
of intangibles); David S. Gelb, Intangible Assets and Firm Disclosures: An
Empirical Investigation, 29 J. Bus. FIN. & ACcT. 457, 473 (2002) ("The results

presented in this study indicate that significant levels of intangible assets
impair the usefulness of accounting disclosures even for large firms. These
findings also provide support for the notion expressed by the Special Committee
on Financial Reporting of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (1994) that users desire improved disclosures about firms'
intangible assets.") (citations omitted).
308. See Lev, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that a temptation exists for
companies to change the level of intangibles investment to manage reported
earnings to meet and exceed the expectations of analysts).
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inadequate disclosure by businesses about intangibles.309
Companies may disclose little publicly or specifically, for
example, about research and development or other
innovative activities, or the revenues or expenses generated
by such activities. 310 Moreover, when more detailed
information is revealed, it often occurs in contexts such as
business magazines, in which companies have significant
ability to determine the positioning and nature of disclosures made. 31 ' The lack of detailed disclosure with respect
to intangibles means that it can be difficult to know how
intangibles are actually implemented in a particular business organization, which might be one window from which
to view and verify the specific operational and true
economic contribution of intangibles. 312 The resulting accounting haze thus gives companies a significant amount of
latitude to choose how to frame and situate themselves
within the intangibles paradigm from the perspective of
financial statements and other disclosure documents.
Much like the FASB requirements with respect to
treatment of and disclosure about intangibles in company
financial statements, SEC regulations governing company
preparation of financial statements require very limited
disclosure about intangibles. 313 Although discussion of
intangibles may be required by general guidelines concerning preparation of financial statements, the most substantial, explicit reference to intangible assets appears in
the balance sheet preparation requirements in SEC
Regulation S-X, which requires the following disclosure
with respect to intangibles: "15. Intangible
assets. State
separately each class of such assets which is in excess of
309. See Lev, supra note 6, at 112.
310. Id. (noting that no information is disclosed about investments in
intangibles or revenue generated by such investments, such as patent-licensing
fees or shares of revenue coming from new products).
311. Baruch Lev, Research and Development and Capital Markets, 11 J.
APPL. CORP. FIN. 21, 21 (1999).
312. Id. (noting that lack of disclosure leaves investors in the dark about
how companies allocate resources with respect to research and development
budgets, product development, amounts involved in other intangibles, including
software development and acquisition, brand enhancement and employee
training).
313. See Shorter, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that Regulation S-X outlines
the standards that registered public companies and their accountants must
follow in generating financial statements).
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five percent of the total assets, along with the basis of
determining the respective amounts. Any 314
significant
addition or deletion shall be explained in a note."
Sarbanes-Oxley, adopted on July 30, 2002, modified the
corporate governance and disclosure requirements for
companies with publicly traded securities. 315 Although
adopted largely in response to several corporate scandals in
which intangibles were in some instances a factor in
corporate deception or fraud, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC
rules promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley do not contain
specific requirements with respect to intangibles or
accounting more generally. 316 Sarbanes-Oxley may, however, have an impact on the quality of corporate-level
disclosure about intangibles as a consequence of the
requirements for criminal and civil certifications of
financial statements and company disclosures by CEOs and
CFO, and civil and criminal penalties if such certifications
prove to be false. 317 At the same time, however, disclosure
with respect to intangibles is further complicated by the
uncertainty often inherent in intangibles, which may
potentially expose companies to securities law liability in

314. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02 (2005). Other references to intangibles or
intangible assets in Regulation S-X are quite specialized, including references
in relation to accumulated depreciation, excess cost over intangible assets
required and other assets that constitute greater than 30 percent of
stockholders' equity, intangible drilling and development costs and intangible
utility plants of public utilities. Regulation S-K disclosure requirements with
respect to narrative descriptions of a business require the registered company to
disclose "[t]he importance to the segment and the duration and effect of all
patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises and concessions held," 17 C.F.R. §
229.101(1)(iv), as well as requirements with respect to required exhibits
relating to material contracts involving patents and other intangibles.
315. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) (2002); see generally Michael
A. Perino, Some Reflections on the DeterrenceAspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671 (2002) (assessing the deterrence value of
Sarbanes Oxley).
316. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
317. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906, 116 Stat.
745, 777, 806 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241, 18 U.S.C. § 1350) (2002). See
also James R. Myers, Intellectual Property Master Class: "IP Asset
Management After Sarbanes-Oxley," Slides 9, 22 (Sept. 9, 2003), http://
www.kilpatrickstockton.compublications/vv details.aspx?ID=26 (noting that
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that intellectual assets must be reported).
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the event that predictions about intangibles should prove to
318
be incorrect.
C. Verifiability and Transparency under the Intangibles
Paradigm:The Usefulness of FinancialStatements
current
Differential
accounting
treatment
and
disclosure requirements have a significant effect on the
transparency and verifiability of the economic reality of
intangible resources. Lack of information about and
coherent standards with respect to intangibles makes it
more difficult to measure, independently evaluate, and
verify the true role that intangibles play in a particular
business organization. 319 From an information perspective,
then, the actual basis underlying any company-specific
market-to-book gap may not be truly ascertainable, nor is it
certain that accounting rules will adequately capture the
true sources of value for businesses operating under an
intangibles paradigm. As a result, companies may have
greater ability to characterize and frame themselves in
such a way as to emphasize the importance of intangibles
and manage earnings accordingly, with the knowledge that
the nature of the accounting system makes such
characterizations less transparent and more difficult to
verify. 320 Such characterizations may be given more
credence than they might otherwise have, thus making
intangibles potentially more susceptible to manipulation
than is the case with tangible assets.
By emphasizing the importance of intangibles from a
business and operational perspective, a firm can also
318. BLAIR & WALLMAN, supra note 159, at 73-83 (discussing legal changes
that might be required to provide greater certainty about rights in intangibles).
319. van Ark, supra note 26, at 13 ('Despite its recognized importance, the
problems concerning the conceptualization of intangible capital, its measurement
and integration into a production function or growth accounting framework are
still huge and largely unresolved."); Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Market
Valuation of R&D Expenditures 29, Dec. 1998, http://www.stern.nyu.edul-blev/
research.html (noting that the market appears to be able to value research and
development investments and market valuations of research and development
positively related to estimates of firm value).
320. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1052 ("Financial statements and footnotes
are very summary documents. Decision making about treatments goes on in a
black box, evolving as a matter of practice amongst insiders. There is no
comparable moment of transparency respecting the law-to-fact application. This
diminishes the chance for outside evaluation.") (citations omitted).
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attempt to maximize the influence of such assets on overall
firm market value, regardless of whether this emphasis
reflects economic reality. 321 One study of firms with high
advertising and research and development expenditures
found that because such firms are more likely to view
mandatory GAAP disclosures as inadequate, they are more
likely to focus on alternative disclosures to signal company
value, including
financial signals such as share repurchases
322
and dividends.
Signaling behaviors with respect to intangibles and
intellectual property are another way in which companies
signal markets concerning an aggressive value maximizing
approach to development and enforcement of rights with
respect to intangibles, including intellectual property
rights. 323 Such behaviors have been used by The SCO
Group, for example, in its assertions of rights emanating
from copyright claims with respect to Linux code. 324 Such
assertions of legal rights in this context were initially
associated with an increase
in SCO stock price of more than
seven hundred percent. 325
One significant consequence of the intangibles haze has
been the decline in the usefulness of financial statements
for investors, on account of their failure to accurately reflect
economic value and underlying economic reality. 326 This has
321. Id. at 1039 ("Readers of financial reports are not on notice to bring
skepticism to bear, at least until very recently. Even if they proceed cautiously,
they get only indirect means, within the reports' four corners, with which to sort
number influenced by advocacy from harder numbers uninfluenced by
management's agenda.").
322. See Gelb & Siegel, supranote, 249, at 309-10.
323. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29, at 72-84 (discussing
series of five lawsuits involving IBM, Novell, RedHat, Daimler-Chrysler and
Autozone, connected to SCO's assertions of rights).
324. Id. at 72-75 (noting that SCO does not in fact appear to own the Unix
copyrights).
325. Id. 82-83.
326. JOHNSON & KAPLAN, supra note 112, at 183-207 (discussing why
accounting measures no longer provide relevant or appropriate measures of
business operations); Amir & Lev, supra note 163, at 4-5 (suggesting that
financial information alone is irrelevant for valuation of cellular companies
because accounting measurement and reporting systems cannot provide valuerelevant information because of the high level of intangibles in wireless
industry, although financial information combined with nonfinancial
information does help explain market prices); Cafiibano et al., supra note 41, at
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implications for regulatory regimes governing business. The
intangibles haze consequently may undercut such financial
regulatory measures. One aspect of the greater risk and
uncertainty of intangibles from an accounting perspective
relates to the fact that companies often lack full control
over intangibles. 327 Intangibles are also often difficult to
measure, quantify, and value. 328 For this reason, the
verifiability of intangible assets is an important question,
and verifiability problems exist with respect to intangibles
as compared to tangible resources. This lesser degree of
verifiability is rooted in the risks, uncertainty and lack of
transparency that is typical of intangibles today.329
Verifiability thus provides an important behavioral check in
the world of tangible assets that is far too often not
available to the same extent for intangibles. GAAP has
been characterized as a blend of uninformative and largely
verifiable descriptions of past transactions, and informative
and largely unverifiable projections of future income. 330
3 31
Intangibles typically fall into the latter category.
30 ("Failure to correctly reflect the impact of intangibles on the current and
future performance of the business implies that accounting statements fail to
present an unbiased (true and fair) view of the firm's financial position.
Therefore, investors are provided with non-relevant and non-comparable
financial statements and will most likely not be able to assess the value of
companies to make efficient resource allocation decisions."); Francis & Schipper,
supra note 163, at 321 (noting that the explanatory power of earnings
information has declined, while the explanatory power of balance sheet and
book value information has increased over the same time period); Lev &
Zarowin, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that usefulness of financial information
has declined over the last 20 years). But cf. Brett Trueman, et al., The Eyeballs
Have It: Searching for the Value in Internet Stocks, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 137, 139
(2000) (noting that Internet company stock values are not associated with net
income, but rather a relationship between exists between gross profit and stock
market prices, suggesting that investors may just value such companies
differently).
327. LEV, supra note 18, at 83.
328. Gelb & Siegel, supra note 249, at 308 (noting that users have
reservations about valuation of intangibles by managers since intangibles are
difficult to quantify and value accurately, but that users nonetheless desire
additional information and disclosure about intangibles).
329. See LEV, supra note 18, at 37-42, 89-90 (noting risks, uncertainty and
lack of transparency that is typical of intangibles).
330. See Ronen, supra note 259, at 84.
331. See LEV, supra note 18, at 81 ("practically every material item on the
balance sheet and income statement, with the exception of cash, is based on
subjective estimates about future events").
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The ways in which accounting rules have been applied
in the intangibles paradigm context has created a haze of
uncertainty, with few standards for reliable disclosure
concerning intangibles. 332 This vacuum has been filled, at
least to some extent, by business framing and discourse
controlled by companies that seek to position themselves
within the intangibles paradigm in an attempt to maximize
firm market value. 333 This background is instructive for
considering examples involving the use of intangibles in
specific business contexts under the intangibles paradigm.
IV. INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE:
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTANGIBLES HAZE

The internal generation of many intangibles may pose
concerns for transparency and verifiability. Even if the
expenditures for an intangible can be accurately measured,
questions may continue to exist concerning the verifiability
of the asset or resource. Fear of uncertainty has been one
reason that accounting systems have not historically
permitted capitalization of intangibles.33 4 In addition,
accountants do not always have the expertise that might be
needed to appropriately address the role of intangibles in
business organizations. 335 As a result, a broad range of
potential issues arise under the intangibles paradigm with

332. Several countries and companies have, however, implemented schemas
or strategies for dealing with intangibles. See, e.g., P.N. Bukh et al.,
Constructing Intellectual Capital Statements, 17 SCAND. J. MGMT. 87 (2001)
(analyzing development of intellectual capital statements at 19 Danish firms);
Danish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Intellectual Capital StatementsThe New Guidelines (Feb. 2003), http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/cgibin/theme-list.cgi?themeid=100650&_lang=uk (setting forth guidelines for
preparing intellectual capital statements).
333. See infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text for discussion regarding
Enron.
334. See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 3 (noting that the rationale for
expensing R&D is the belief that benefits are uncertain and may occur only
when research leads to a commercial product); Gelb & Siegel, supra note 249, at
307 (noting that GAAP does not generally permit capitalization of intangibles
assets such as patents, technology and brand names, despite the fact that such
assets are often of significant value to a company).
335. See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 831 (noting that one reason SFAS 2
requires that all intangibles be expensed is that accountants lack the expertise
to evaluate key intangible assets and want to protect their turf).
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regard to how to actually measure and represent intangible
resources.
A. The Intangibles Paradigmand the Measurement and
Management of Earnings
1. The Intangibles Paradigmand Aggressive Accounting
Practices. Because existing regulatory frameworks do not
fully take account of the intangibles paradigm, the advent
of this paradigm has enabled certain companies to
obfuscate their financial reporting, and has increased their
capacity to engage in fraud.3 3 6 This was particularly evident
in the late 1990s during the height of the market bubble
when a significant number 33of7 companies engaged in
"creative" accounting practices.
Such creative accounting
practices and the manifest fraud at companies such as
Enron were facilitated by the application or misapplication
of existing financial reporting and securities disclosure
requirements. 338 These practices thus reflect how current
rules and regulatory structures can be manipulated in the
context of intangibles paradigm business practices. This
ability to manipulate such structures is in large part due to
the fact that such structures do not adequately contemplate
the intangibles paradigm:
Another fundamental problem underlying the recent spate of
accounting shockers is the fact that GAAP is increasingly out of
sync with today's business realities. The accounting rules were
developed in an industrial economy, but this is the information
age. How do you precisely measure the value of R&D, customer
lists, brand names, patents, and other intellectual property? Of

336. In this respect, the intangibles paradigm presents opportunities for
financial engineering that may be distinguishable from accounting
manipulation. See Dharan, supra note 93, at 111 (noting that lack of disclosure
transparency is one consequence of financial engineering, which may be
distinguished from accounting manipulation).
337. See Coffee, supra note 264, at 282-85 (noting that the most common
cause of restatements was efforts of management to prematurely recognize
income); Lorraine Magrath & Leonard G. Weld, Abusive Earnings Management
and Early Warning Signs, CPA J. ONLINE (Aug. 2004), http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2002/0802/features/fO85002.htm (discussing earnings management
practices).
338. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1055 ("GAAP's present rules, applied in
good faith, were more than adequate to pick up the material misstatements in
Enron's financials.").
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course, this situation creates opportunities for creativity, like the
ballooning practice of in-process R&D writeoffs. Former SEC
Commissioner Steve Wallman says, "GAAP is not broke but is
getting increasingly rusty." Others are less charitable.
Superlawyer Bill Lerach, the king of securities class action suits,
suggests renaming GAAP "Cleverly Rigged Accounting Ploys," or
,,CRAP.,,339

The intangibles paradigm has unfolded in a corporate
context in which earnings management is a widespread

practice. 340 Once abusive earnings management practices
begin, managers will typically spend time devising methods
to ensure that such practices continue. 34 1 Abusive earnings
management practices and manipulation of GAAP can also
be difficult for outsiders to detect. 3 42 Intangibles paradigm
financial statements often do not accurately represent
economic reality, may lack transparency, and may be difficult to verify. As a result, the intangibles paradigm may
present companies with additional opportunities and ways
in which to manage earnings, manipulate GAAP, and, in
some cases, commit fraud. 34 3 This is likely one factor in the
marked increase in earnings restatements in the five years
3 44
ending in 2002.
One underlying reason for such restatements
aggressive accounting practices, particularly in

was
the

339. Dowd, supra note 83, at 4.

340. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Speech at NYU Center for Law
and Business: The "Numbers Game" (Sept. 1999), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (noting that earnings management is a
widespread but little-challenged custom, and includes practices such as "big
bath" restructuring charges, creative acquisition accounting, "cookie jar
reserves," "immaterial" misapplications of accounting principles and the
premature recognition of revenue).
341. See Magrath & Weld, supra note 337.
342. Id.
343. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1023 ("The stock market awakened in
2002 to discover that it no longer had numbers it could trust. Securities issuers
• . . had been adopting aggressive, even fraudulent treatments to enhance
reported earnings, and their auditors had been doing nothing to stop them.")
(citations omitted).
344. See Coffee, supra note 264, at 282-85 (noting increase in earnings
restatements of more than 250% in the five years ending in 2002).
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technology sector. 345 Although such aggressive and creative
accounting practices were by no means new, the intangibles
paradigm has made it easier for companies to obscure
economic reality through varied methods of representation,
including through use of financial statements, required
disclosure, and intangibles paradigm discourse. 346 Consequently, the intersection of aggressive accounting practices
and the intangibles paradigm provided companies with new
ways through which financial statements might be
creatively adjusted and manipulated to both manage
earnings and commit fraud.
In addition to presenting new opportunities for doing
business, the intangibles paradigm thus presents new
opportunities for committing fraud. A recent study by the
Financial Executives Research Foundation, Inc. (FEI)
suggests that intangibles-intensive companies were consistently found among the top ten in terms of market losses
resulting from financial restatements in 1998 to 2000. 34 7 In
2000, five of the top ten financial restatements involved
either technology companies or accounting issues relating to
intangibles (Microstrategy, Lucent, Legato, Alphapharma,
345. See Edward Iwata, More Firms Falsify Revenue To Boost Stocks, USA
TODAY, Mar. 29, 2000, at B1 (noting widespread "revenue recognition problem"

involving falsifying revenue and using aggressive accounting practices that was
most widespread in the technology sector); Matt Krantz, CDNow Gains in
Question, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 1999, at B1 (discussing 200% increase in sales for
ecommerce company CDNow that violated accounting norms by adding value of
coupons redeemed by customers to revenue); Susan Hwang & Judith Burns,
Amazon Says SEC Ends Inquiry on Stock Payments by Web Firms, WALL ST. J.,
June 11, 2002, at B4 (discussing end of SEC inquiry into Amazon's accounting
treatment of stock payments to the company by Internet companies, which
Amazon booked as revenue, with no enforcement proceeding recommended);
Dowd, supra note 83 (noting pernicious and pervasive, but mostly legal,
manipulation of corporate financial statements to meet or beat analysts'
earning expectations).
346. See Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, Fuzzy Accounting Raises Flags, USA
TODAY, June 22, 2001, at B1 (noting pressure for financial performance as
important factor in manipulation of financial numbers); David Wessel, Venal
Sins: Why Boardroom Bad Guys Have Now Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 2002, at Al (noting that the scope and scale of corporate fraud in the
late 1990s was surpassed only by the years preceding the Great Depression).
347. See FEI Research Foundation, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of
Financial Reporting (2001), http://www.fei.org/download/QualFinRep-6-132kl.ppt (reporting a spike in restatements that began in 1998, noting that on
average 49 restatements occurred in 1997, as compared with 91, 150 and 156 in
1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively).

20061

THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

and Avon Products). 348 The same was true in 1999 (Yahoo,
Texas Instruments, BMC Software, Lycos, and Xilinx). In
1998, four of the top ten financial restatements involved
either technology companies or accounting issues relating to
intangibles (Boston Scientific, Envoy Corp. SmarTalk, and
Telxon). 349 A number of the restatements described in the
FEI study, including Yahoo, BMC Software, and Lycos,
related to accounting treatment of in-process research and
development expenses. 350 Although far from conclusive, the
FEI results suggest that further exploration of the
intersection between aggressive accounting practices and
the intangibles paradigm might be fruitful.
Enron represents one aspect of use of the intangibles
paradigm that reflects a difference in both degree and kind.
Enron exemplifies the use of corporate representations of
economic reality that actually serve to obscure such reality.
Enron also demonstrates how intangibles paradigm discourse can be used in the course of such representations to
commit fraud and illustrates the dangers of regulatory
frameworks that have yet to adjust to the economic reality
of new business practices.
2. The Intangibles Paradigm and Fraud at Enron.
Enron was once one of the largest companies in the
world. 35 1 For six consecutive years from 1996 to 2001,
Enron was named by Fortune Magazine as the nation's
most innovative company. 352 Fortune also ranked Enron in
2001 as one of its "10 Stocks to Last the Decade." 353 In
August 2000, Enron's stock reached an all time high of
$90.56 per share (a multiple of seventy times its then
reported earnings). 354 In the one year period from January
2001 to January 2002, the market capitalization of Enron
decreased by $63 billion. 355 In addition, its CEO Jeffrey
Skilling resigned, and Enron filed for bankruptcy on
December 2, 2001.356 By the time of its bankruptcy filing,
Enron's stock price had fallen to $0.29 per share. 357 The
Enron case, although unusual in its magnitude, to some
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id.; see also HURON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 62, at 12
(noting that in-process research and development expense concerns relate to
instances where companies value acquired in-process research and development
using methods inconsistent with those preferred by the SEC).
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extent reflects aspects of business and accounting practices
of the time. One casualty of such practices was ultimately
Enron's accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, for whom Enron
was the last of several accounfing mishaps. 358 The dramatic
fall of Enron occurred during a climate of aggressive
accounting practices reflected in, among other practices,3 intangibles paradigm framing and discourse by companies. 59

351. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9, 9 (2002) (noting that Enron was once the seventh
largest corporation in America with revenues over $100 billion).
352. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002); Jeffrey D.
Van Niel, Enron-The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); see also
Sherman, supra note 261.
353. See Van Niel, supra note 352, at 11.
354. See Alyson Tonge, Lesley Greer & Alan Lawton, The Enron Story: You
Can Fool Some of the People Some of the Time .... 12 Bus. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN
REVIEW 4, 5 (2003). Enron received laudatory press coverage as well. See Erin
Davies, Enron: The Power's Back On, FORTUNE, Apr. 13, 1998, at 24; Brian
O'Reilly, The Power Merchant, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2000, at 148. Since Enron's
earnings reflected numbers largely manufactured by Enron, this multiple is
quite inaccurate given that Enron's actual earnings were much lower than its
reported earnings.
355. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient CapitalMarkets, CorporateDisclosure
and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 394 (2004).
356. Bethany McLean, Enron's Power Crisis, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 2001, at 48
(noting resignation of Skilling); THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 20, 32
(noting resignation of Skilling in August 2001 and Enron bankruptcy filing in
December 2001).
357. Tonge et al., supra note 354, at 21.
358. See Greg Farrell, Andersen Papers Lost in Sunbeam Case, USA TODAY,
Jan. 30, 2002, at B1, available at http://cgi.usatoday.com/money/energy/
2002-01-31-andersen-unbeam.htm#more; McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at
144-46; Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen, CHIG. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2002,
availableat http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0209010315sep0 l,1,
1705920.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Civil War Splits
Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 2002, availableat http://www.chicagotribune.
comlbusiness/chi-0209020071sep02,1,2033601.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravelutl; Flynn McRoberts, Ties To Enron Blinded Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3,
2002, availableat http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0209030210
sep03,1,657342.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Repeat
Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://www.
chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0209040368sep04,1,7342030.story?coll=chibusinessbiztravel-utl.
359. See supra notes 340 to 347 and accompanying text.
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A number of internal and external factors may have
contributed to Enron's financial collapse and bankruptcy
filing. These include inadequate deterrence by gatekeepers
such as analysts, auditors, rating agencies, and lawyers;
changes in compensation structure of businesses generally
resulting in more emphasis on equity compensation; a market bubble that muted investor responses to overvalued
companies; changes in corporate governance practices
by Enron
generally; aggressive earnings management
3 60
managers; and Enron corporate culture.
Although Enron's collapse was caused by a number of
factors, perceptions of Enron as evident in its market
valuation and Fortune accolades were likely tied to Enron's
sophisticated representations of economic reality through
framing. This framing served to establish the particular
framework within which Enron communicated information
about the company to various audiences. Such framing also
made liberal use of intangibles paradigm discourse combined with impenetrable financial statement presentations,
extensive financial manipulation, and fraud. 361 Enron's
operation within the intangibles paradigm at the level of
discourse, at least, was a key factor in its ability to
transform its image from that of a pipeline company into a
new economy exemplary.
360. See, e.g., ENRON & BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L.
Ammons eds., 2002); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98 (giving overview of the
rise and fall of Enron); Yaniv Grinstein, Complementary Perspectives on
"Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron," 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 503 (2004) (discussing the Macey efficient markets and disclosure
discussion); Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2003) (discussing the role of rating agencies at Enron);
Mark Jickling, The Enron Collapse: An Overview of FinancialIssues (Mar. 28,
2003), CRS Report for Congress RS21135 (giving overview of the accounting
and other factors underlying fall of Enron); William S. Lerach, Plundering
America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate
Insiders-The Rise of the New CorporateKleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BuS. & FIN.
69, 104-125 (2002) (discussing lessons learned from Enron and WorldCom);
Macey, supra note 355 (discussing disclosure and efficient capital markets
considerations with respect to Enron collapse); Bethany McLean, Why Enron
Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58 (discussing the principal factors
behind Enron's fall); Rhode & Patton, supra note 351 (discussing the role of
lawyers in Enron collapse); Ronald R. Simms, & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron
Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More Than Codes), 45 J. Bus. ETHICS 243 (2003)
(discussing the role of Enron corporate culture).
361. See infra notes 362-68.
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In the ten years following its formation in 1985, Enron
transformed itself from an owner of natural gas pipelines
into a highly leveraged trading operation. 362 A key element
of Enron's ability to conduct its business during this time
period was connected to its receiving permission from the
SEC to adopt mark-to-market accounting methods for its
energy contracts. 363 Mark-to-market accounting enabled
Enron to become a trading and financial deal-making
company. 364 Enron used mark-to-market accounting aggressively to recognize revenue for future claims under
contracts and other types of transactions.3 65 Valuation of
such claims, contracts, and transactions was based on
assumed fair values. These fair values were often made
based on quite questionable criteria and were also subject
to manipulation. 366 Enron also typically made only positive
adjustments, and frequently neglected to make even clearly
necessary write-downs of assets. 367 Enron also established
362. Frank

Partnoy,

Enron and the Derivatives World,

in

ENRON:

CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 169, 169 (Nancy B. Rappaport &

Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (noting that Enron made more money trading
derivatives in the year 2000 alone than Long-Term Capital Management, a
notable hedge fund that lost $5.6 billion on more than $1 trillion of derivatives
and was rescued in a private bailout in 1998, made in its entire history).
363. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron's Reporting
of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 104 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004);
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 39-42; C. William Thomas, The Rise and
Fall of Enron, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 2002, at 41, available at http://www.aicpa.
org/pubs/jofa/apr2002/thomas.htm (noting Enron's lack of transparency in
reporting its financial affairs).
364. Dharan & Bufkins, supra note 363, at 104 (noting that mark-to-market
accounting was the genesis of Enron's transformation into a trading and
financial deal making firm); Thomas, supra note 363 (noting the unprecedented
scale of Enron's use of mark-to-market accounting).
365. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons form a Perfect
Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Cultural
Failures, 39 CAL. W.L. REV. 163, 175 (2003) ("By the time of its collapse, Enron
had eighty percent of its earnings from 'wholesale energy operations and
services' or contracts for sales of power it was not generating but purchasing
from others, then hedging, then leveraging and then hedging again, all based on
its valuation of its contracts using mark-to-market accounting.").
366. See Benston, supra note 52, at 1348 (noting that fair values are readily
manipulated).
367. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 128 (noting that Enron
delayed recording losses by refusing to write off dead deals); THE POWERS
REPORT, supra note 61, at 74 (noting that Enron transactions with the two LJM
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SPEs intentionally structured to remove debt from Enron's
balance sheet, 368 thus removing two-thirds of Enron's debt
from its balance sheet. 36 9 Enron used derivatives and SPEs
to manipulate its financial statements by using mark-tomarket
accounting to inflate its financial statement results. 370
Although Enron's primary money making operations
371
were those of a speculative derivatives trading operation,
Enron did not want to be valued like a trading operation,
which trade at lower valuations. 372 Instead, Enron took
advantage of the increasingly prevalent intangibles
paradigm discourse of the mid- and late 1990s in an
attempt to position itself as a new economy company and
thus receive a new economy company valuation. Although
he is described as a Luddite:
Skilling touted broadband as the Next Big Thing for Enron ....
If
Skilling was going to get Enron an Internet-style valuation-and
partnerships had a significant financial statement impact and resulted in
substantial recognition of income and the avoidance of substantial recognition
of losses).
368. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special
Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309-10
(2002) ("It now appears that Enron engaged in a range of complex transactions,
designed to achieve accounting rather than operating results. Its primary
motivation was to minimize financial-statement losses and volatility, accelerate
profits, and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet, which could have hurt
Enron's credit rating and thereby damaged its credibility in the energy trading
business.") (citations omitted); POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 109-10 (noting
concern by some at Enron North America that the assets placed into the Talon
LLC entity, which was an Enron "Raptor" vehicle involved in "hedging"
transactions with Enron, were assets that were expected to decline
substantially in value, thus eliminating a potential "drag" on Enron's earnings).
369. Macey, supranote 355, at 419.
370. See Partnoy, supra note 362, at 171 (noting that Enron hid losses on
technology stocks, concealed huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable new
businesses and inflated the value of other troubled assets); see also THE POWERS
REPORT, supra note 61, at 133 (noting that $1.07 billion of $1.51 billion, or
71.5%, of Enron earnings were attributable to the "Raptor" vehicles between the
third quarter of 2000 and third quarter of 2001).
371. See Portnoy, supra note 362, at 183.
372. See McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 126 (noting that companies
with primarily trading businesses trade at low stock valuations); Tonge et al.,
supra note 354, at 5 (noting that Enron at its peak traded at 70 times earnings,
which is significantly higher than the 20 times earnings that an established and
well regarded investment banking and trading firm, such as Goldman Sachs,
trades).
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there was nothing he wanted more-he'd have to convince Wall
Street that Enron was becoming, at least in part, an Internet
company ... the relationship between the Internet and the stock
373
market was something he understood all too well.

In keeping with this framing, Enron also launched
business operations and practices such as Enron Online and
Enron Broadband to take advantage of existing market
conditions that gave higher valuations to new economy
companies. Enron Online, for example, was a trading
system that Enron developed for its energy trading
business:
The story of the creation of Enron Online became an instant
corporate legend and a key part of the Enron myth, testimony to
how Enron's culture fostered an entrepreneurial spirit that was at
the root of the company's success. .

.

. It also helped that EOL

[Enron Online] was unveiled at the height of the Internet mania,
when any business conducted online had to be a good thing, almost
37 4
by definition.

Enron also described itself as a culture that "supported
innovation"
in common with the then high-flying dot3 75
coms.

Enron basically engaged in heavy intangibles paradigm
discourse, which was misleading and deceptive, because
Enron did not invest in research and development that
would reflect or explain the magnitude of the intangibles it
claimed to have. 376 Evidence that precipitated Enron's
377
downfall had in fact been disclosed publicly by Enron.
373. McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 184-85.
374. Id. at 222.
375. See id. at 118, 121 ('Much of what Skilling was selling had the effect of
positioning Enron as a company that had more in common with the dot-corns
than with an old energy giant like Exxon.").
376. See Lev, supra note 2, at 131-32.
377. See McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 407 ("[T]here was more than
enough on the public records to raise the hackles of any self-respecting
analyst."); THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 187, 197 (noting that Enron's
financial statement disclosures included information about related party
transactions, including their magnitude and some of the mechanics of the
transactions themselves, but that such disclosures were fundamentally
inadequate, including footnote disclosures that "did not communicate the
essence of the transactions in a sufficiently clear fashion to enable a reader of
the financial statements to understand what was going on.").
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Potential gatekeepers that might have detected Enron's
fraud appear to have been captivated by the impressions
that Enron sought to instill through intangibles paradigm
discourse and framing. Consequently, gatekeepers and
others frequently accepted Enron's assertions with little
critical scrutiny. When Enron unveiled its broadband
strategy at its annual analysts meeting on January 19 and
20, 2000, Enron's performance included a surprise guest,
Scott McNealy, President of Sun Microsystems, who
announced Enron's purchase of 18,000 Sun routers for its
network.378 During the second day of the meeting, Enron's
stock price rose by twenty-six percent within the course of
the day. 379 Time to reflect did not make analysts look more
critically at their assessments of Enron, and the reactions
can only be described as euphoric. 380 Although some
analysts did complain about how difficult Enron's financial
statements were to read, 381 it was not until well into 2001
that serious questions began to be raised about Enron's
financial status and the fact that no one
really understood
38 2
how Enron's business actually worked.
In addition to benefiting from the hype associated with
the Internet boom, the management of Enron was also good
378. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 243.
379. Id. at 244.
380. See id. (noting that Merrill Lynch's analyst Donato Eassey stated
"[a]lthough this is an energy company, in our view, Enron fits the description of
a 'New Economy' stock..."); O'Reilly, supra note 354, at 148.
381. Jennings, supra note 365, at 195 (indicating that one analyst noted
that Enron operated as a "giant hedge fund" without disclosing that risk in SEC
filings).
382. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 61, at 17 (noting that the disclosures in
Enron's publicly filed reports "were obtuse, did not communicate the essence of
transactions completely or clearly, and failed to convey the substance of what
was going on between Enron and the partnerships"); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra
note 98, at 318-23 (noting that questions were first asked about Enron in the
fall of 2000 in Texas Journal, a regional Wall Street Journal supplement, in an
article that focused on mark-to-market accounting and Fortune in the winter of
2001, leading short sellers to begin shorting Enron stock); Bethany McLean, Is
Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122 (characterizing Enron's
business as a black box and noting that for all the lavish attention that Enron
received, how Enron actually made money remained impenetrable to outsiders);
Bethany McLean, Ken, Lay Your Cards on the Table, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 2001,
at 37 (noting that questions continue to exist about the true profitability of
Enron's core energy trading business); see also Greg Farrell & Del Jones, How
Did Enron Come Unplugged?, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2002, at 1B; Jonathan D.
Glater, Enron's Many Strands:Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at C1.
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at selling particular representations of Enron that were
directed toward an audience that was happy to receive
Enron's representations with an exceedingly noncritical
eye. Jeffrey Skilling, the COO for a long period of time, and
more briefly
the CEO, was in particular a "master
383
presenter."
Enron's framing, both through presentations and
actions, enabled it to maintain a high stock price, at least
for a while, which itself alone can serve an important
purpose for companies. 38 4 In the end, however, even the
best presentations were not enough to sustain a company
with chaotic operations sustained by fraudulent accounting
and reliance on financial manipulation and deceptive
3s 5
discourse rather than competent business practices.
B. IntegratingICTs: The Wal-Mart DistributionSystem
In contrast to Enron, Wal-Mart's representations of
economic reality and its engagement with the intangibles
paradigm appear to be more accurate depictions of WalMart's actual business practices. Wal-Mart, the world's
largest retailer, 38 6 is the biggest company and employer in
the United States, 38 7 with some 1.3 million employees and
fiscal year 2004 revenues of more than $256 billion. 388
Although it is not in the ICT sector, Wal-Mart has been an
early adopter of technology in its business operations. WalMart was one of the first retail companies to introduce a
383. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 233.
384. See Daniel C. Langevoort, The OrganizationalPsychology of HyperCompetition: CorporateIrresponsiblityand the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH.

L. REV. 968, 972 (2002) ("As Enron shows, a high stock price has an
independent competitive purpose-it provides an acquisition currency and a
source of collateral that can be used to facilitate substantial (often hidden)
leveraging ....
Also, and perhaps more subtly, stock price is a metric by which
to test the success of the control group currently in power in a firm with much
hard-to-measure value, and hence goes deeply to their sense of identity.")
385. See generally MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98.

386. See Stephen J. Arnold & John Fernie, Wal-Mart in Europe: Prospects
for the UK, 17 INT'L MARKETING REV. 416, 421 (2000) (noting the number of WalMart employees); WAL-MART, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2004) (stating that
revenues were more than $256 billion for the fiscal year ended January 31,
2004).
387. Cora Daniels, Women vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE, July 21, 2003, at 78.
388. Cora Daniels, Unions vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE, May 17, 2004, at 112.
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comprehensive logistic system in its stores, spending more
than $1 billion on information technology. 38 9 This investment permitted Wal-Mart to process orders directly from
retail stores to suppliers based on actual sales. This
investment thus enabled Wal-Mart to replace inventory
with a just-in-time delivery system based on the
information provided through its logistics system. 3 90
Wal-Mart has throughout its history made significant
investments in technology to minimize costs and facilitate
management. 391 Wal-Mart began installing a satellite
system that enabled stores to communicate with Wal-Mart
headquarters and computerized the company's distribution
system in 1976.392 By the early 1990s, this communication
system had developed into Retail-Link, which provides
point-of-sale data on sales trends and inventories of the
suppliers' products on a store by store basis. 393 Wal-Mart's
distribution and communications systems are built inhouse. 394 The Retail-Link system cost Wal-Mart an
395
estimated $4 billion to develop.
Companies such as Wal-Mart, Dell, and Cisco have
used technology to redefine the nature of relationships with
their suppliers. Both Dell and Wal-Mart have focused on
maintaining low inventories and streamlining distribution
processes so as to cut costs that can be passed on to
customers. 396 Wal-Mart's computer systems track a myriad
of information and require that suppliers use the same
system. As a result, Wal-Mart has made technology a core
competency. 397
389. DAUM, supra note 65, at 14.

390. Id.
391. See Sandra S. Vance & Roy V. Scott, Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.: A Study in Modern Southern Entrepreneurship, 58 J.S. HIST. 231, 242

(1992) (noting that Wal-Mart invested in an IBM 370/135 computer system in
the mid-1970s for inventory control, payroll and other financial records and to
obtain statistical data about store sales).
392. Eryn Brown, America's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, Mar. 1,
1999, at 68.
393. Arnold & Fernie, supra note 386, at 422.
394. See Brown, supranote 392.
395. Arnold & Fernie, supra note 386, at 422.
396. See Brown, supra note 392.
397. See id.
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Despite
the
greater
accuracy
of Wal-Mart's
representations of economic reality and the fact that
technology is a core feature of Wal-Mart's business, specific
disclosure with respect to ICTs and intangibles is minimal
in Wal-Mart financial statements. The role of ICTs and
intangibles is consequently not transparent and is thus
hard to verify. The estimated $4 billion Wal-Mart spent on
its technology and communications systems is not recorded
on its balance sheet. Wal-Mart income statements, which
may contain expenses incurred during the time period
covered by the statement, do not break out these expenses
separately or indicate the magnitude of such expenses. As a
result, public information about Wal-Mart in magazine and
academic articles at times provides more useful information
about the company's principal intangibles than do WalMart's financial statements and disclosures.
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

The intangibles paradigm raises a host of issues with
respect to existing regulatory frameworks, including those
in relation to securities disclosure, accounting and financial
reporting, capital requirements, and tax laws. The reforms
precipitated by Enron and other corporate scandals did not
really touch upon the core of operation of the intangibles
paradigm that underlay many of the activities that such
reforms were intended to address. In addition, such reforms
do not address the distortions in the representation of
economic reality evident in financial statement reporting
and other company disclosures that have been characteristic of the intangibles paradigm. Although reform of existing
regulatory structures is needed, such reform would also
notably play an important role in providing behavioral
incentives by setting standards upon which private
enforcement of established standards is based. 398 Such
398. See Denton Collins, Austin L. Reitenga & Juan Manuel SanchezCuevas, The Managerial Consequences of Earnings Restatements (April 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=771564 (looking
at penalties given to managers connected to earnings restatements); Hemang
Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S. Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty for
Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
(Aug. 2004), availableat http://207.36.165.114/NewOrleans/Papers/1401148.pdf
(noting importance of private penalties and enforcement of GAAP rules).
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private enforcement is quite important since the SEC, for
example, is constrained by resources. Much enforcement of
GAAP is actually done by corporations and their Boards of
Directors.399

As then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted in 1998,
"[t]he significance of transparent, timely and reliable
financial statements and its importance to investor
protection have never been more apparent. ' 40 0 Moving
existing securities disclosure and accounting frameworks
fully into the knowledge economy will help ensure that
financial statements and company representations of
economic reality and disclosures with respect to intangibles
provide information that is transparent, reliable, and
relevant to company operations.
A. The IntangiblesHaze and Corporate Governance
The intangibles paradigm represents a potential
challenge to corporate governance structures because of the
uncertainty and greater risk of intangibles. 40 1 This is
particularly true for members of the Board of Directors,
who may not be well-equipped or given adequate information to understand fully the implications of business
practices under the intangibles paradigm. Conducting due
diligence with intangibles may also often be different than
what is required in the case of physical assets.
In addition, since so many intangibles are generated
internally within companies, understanding something of
the nature of such intangibles requires that the company
itself have an accurate assessment of the contribution of
such intangibles to company operations. Such notions of
value can be difficult to penetrate and evaluate effectively.
In addition, both internal and external understandings
have the potential to be skewed or distorted as a result of
intangibles paradigm practices and discourse. Since our
current corporate law system is largely based on self-

399. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
400. Levitt, supra note 340.
401. Cf. GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 55-56 (discussing the relationship
between corporate governance and accounting oversight).
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regulation, the implications for the intangibles haze
for
40 2
corporate governance are potentially quite profound.
The potential negative consequences of intangibles
paradigm business practices for members of the Board of
Directors have been underscored by recent settlements
agreed to by board members at Enron and WorldCom that
entailed payments by such board members out of their
personal assets. 40 3 Coincidentally, both of these companies
were closely involved in financial statement misrepresentations and intangibles paradigm business practices or
discourse. Despite the fact that board members agreed to
settlements out of pocket, such settlements are in and of
themselves unlikely to provide significant behavioral incentives for board members to focus on clearing the intangibles
haze. 404 This is because any behavioral incentives provided
by such settlements may be more than offset by the fact
that board members may also profit from misrepresentations of economic reality in financial statements and
disclosures by virtue of their stock ownership in the
company making such representations. 405 Such settlements
highlight the fact that corporate governance may be
hampered by the dynamics of the intangibles paradigm,
particularly with respect to the lack of transparency and
402. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1024 ("In our self-regulatory system of
corporate law, the job of insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves in the first
instance on the gatekeepers.").
403. See Editorial, Directors on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A14
(discussing WorldCom settlement); Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Directorsof Enron To
Chip In on Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at C1 (noting that a group of
ten former directors of Enron "have agreed to pay $13 million out of their own
pockets as part of a $168 million settlement of a lawsuit brought by onetime
shareholders who lost billions of dollars in the company's collapse in 2001");
Jonathan D. Glater, A Big New Worry for CorporateDirectors,N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2005, at C1 (discussing the $18 million out of pocket settlement from
personal assets by board members of WorldCom to settle a securities class
action suit); Gretchen Morgenson, If Directors Snooze, Now They May Lose, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, § 3 at 1 (noting that WorldCom directors agreed to pay onefifth of their aggregate net worth in the settlement).
404. Lucian Bebchuk, What's $13 Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2005, at A17 (noting that despite the Enron settlement, board members are
not really being held accountable in any way because the ten directors, who sold
Enron shares worth more than $250 million during the period of Enron's
financial statement misrepresentations, are being permitted to pay ten percent
of such directors' pretax profits and keep the remaining ninety percent or $117
million).
405. See id.
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verifiability of certain intangible resources that are an
increasingly predominant source of business value for a
broad range of companies.
B. IncorporatingIntangibles in FinancialStatements:
Measuring the FinancialImpact of Intangibles
Current accounting practices and procedures as
embodied in GAAP do not adequately measure intangibles
or sufficiently contemplate the implications of the
intangibles paradigm for existing measurements. 406
Financial statements that reflect greater recognition of the
intangibles paradigm are a first step in addressing the
intangibles haze. The institutional structure of the
accounting profession and accounting regulation make
changes in GAAP often contested and difficult. 407 This,
combined with the fact that auditors and inside management may engage in rent seeking behavior complicates any
attempt to regulate financial reporting and GAAP.408
Additional disclosure about intangibles would, however,
improve the accuracy of financial statements' representations of economic reality and provide additional information
that may help minimize opportunities for fraud that
currently exist with respect to intangibles paradigm
discourse and company framing. This would in turn help
make financial statements more transparent and reliable.
As a first step to address the intangibles haze,
companies should be required to make additional financial
reporting disclosures about intangibles under GAAP.409

406. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap"
Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL.
REV. 1139, 1147 (2003) ("Orthodox accounting does not apply well at all
intangibles like human and intellectual capital, or to the new style methods
creating and selling products and services.").

in
L.
to
of

407. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1038 ("GAAP is a body of law structurally
shielded from outside inspection. Monitoring GAAP is difficult-to stay abreast
of substantive issues in accounting is to be a member of the guild in the first
place.").
408. Id. at 1026 ("Absent antecedent institutional reform that ensures
auditor independence and lessens the negative impact of rent-seeking and
influence activity on audit quality, perverse effects could follow ...").
409. This proposal contemplates a separate intangibles financial statement.
A separate statement is not absolutely necessary, however, and the
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Companies should be required to specifically identify and
disclose, for example, the principal intangible resources and
assets they use, the implications and significance of such
intangibles, and the potential consequences of loss of value
with respect to such intangibles. Disclosure should also be
made concerning the magnitude and specific nature of the
contribution of intangibles to assets, liabilities, revenues,
and expenses.
These disclosures should focus on four core aspects of
the use of intangibles in business operations: intangibles
numbers, balance sheet impact, revenue impact, and
expense effect. Such statements should be given for results
over the same time periods as GAAP requires with respect
to company financial statements generally.
The first aspect of such statements would be the
disclosure of actual numbers relating to intangibles.
Companies should be required to give an overall picture of
the uses and role of intangibles in company operations. In
addition, companies should be required to specifically
assess the financial statement impact of the intangibles
that they have disclosed. The balance sheet impact portion
of the intangibles financial statement would assess the
financial reporting impact of differential accounting
treatment of intangibles. It would disclose how capitalization, as opposed to expensing intangibles, would influence
financial reporting for the applicable periods. This would
thus require sensitivity testing as to the nature and impact
of particular accounting choices with respect to intangibles.
For example, a company that has certain research and
development expenditures would need to disclose with
much more detail the specific nature of such expenditures.
Such disclosures would need to be balanced against
reasonable needs for companies to not disclose confidential
or proprietary information or trade secrets. In addition to
disclosing more information about the nature of intangible
expenditures and the effects of treating such expenditures
as capital or operating expenses, companies should also be
required to disclose the specific contribution of intangibles
to company revenues and expenses. This would mean, for
example, with respect to the research and development
expenditures noted above, that companies would need to
requirements for such a statement could be incorporated into existing
requirements for financial statements.
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disclose the revenue impact of the expenditures associated
with that particular intangible expense, regardless of
whether an intangible expense is treated as a capital or
operating expense. Companies would thus be required, for
example, to disclose in far greater detail information about
both revenues and expenses in connection with research
and development, which is often currently reported as a line
item in a company's expenses on the income statement.
In addition to greater disclosure with respect to
intangibles, GAAP accounting rules should be modified so
as to minimize the differential treatment of tangible and
intangible assets. One proposal for dealing with the
differential treatment of tangible and intangible assets is to
implement an accounting regime in which all intangible
investments with attributable benefits that have met
certain feasibility tests are recognized as assets. 410 Selective
capitalization of research and development expenses may
increase the usefulness of accounting measures both
statistically and economically. 411 Studies suggest that a
selective approach may work better than any blanket policy
with respect to treatment of expenses associated with
intangibles. 412 An
approach that includes
specific
410. See, e.g., LEV, supra note 18, at 124-25.
411. See generally Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson
II, Evidence on the Usefulness of Capitalizing and Amortizing Research and
Development Costs (Carnegie Mellon University, Carnegie Mellon Accounting
Mini-Conference, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=58661; Dennis
Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson II, ManagerialDiscretion and
Accounting for Research and Development Costs (Working Paper, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=299141.
412. See, e.g., Charles Shi, On the Trade-off between the FutureBenefits and
Riskiness of R&D: A Bondholders' Perspective, 35 J. ACcT. & ECON. 227, 230
(2003) (noting that from a bondholders' perspective, the variance effects or risk
of research and development outweigh mean effects, suggesting that
bondholders see them as less like assets and more as useful measures of risk,
and indicating that these findings do not buttress FASB's research and
development expensing rule); S.P. Kothari, Ted E. Laguerre & Andrew J.
Leone, Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future
Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays (Working Paper,
2001), available at http://web.mit.edulkothari/www/attach/klR&D%20pap%
20May%20%202001.pdf; Baruch Lev, Doron Nissim & Jacob Thomas, On The
Informational Usefulness of R&D Capitalization and Amortization (April 17,
2005), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-blev/docs/On%20the%20infor
mational%20usefulness%20of%20R&D%20capitalization%20and%20amortizati
on%202005.04.17.pdf (suggesting that policy of treating research and
development expenses as capital expenses would be beneficial).
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measurements and disclosure with regard to intangibles
might also address some of the distortions and discrepancies that have become characteristic of financial statements
under the intangibles paradigm.
Similar disclosures should be made in the aggregate for
all intangibles as well as individually for specifically
identified intangibles such as research and development
expenses for specific projects or products, and intangibles
whose impairment could have an impact on the company's
operations or stock market value. Such financial statement
reporting requirements should be combined with additional
disclosure requirements for companies from a securities law
perspective.
C. Intangibles Securities DisclosureFramework: Securities
Regulation in the Knowledge Economy
significant
presents
paradigm
intangibles
The
challenges to existing securities regulation frameworks that
are based on an ethos of disclosure as a core aspect of the
operation of securities markets. 413 Securities laws have
developed under an assumption that a continuous disclosure system helps ensure that securities markets are fair
and honest. 414 The intangibles paradigm has contributed to
financial statement obfuscation and caused existing
disclosures to vary, at times significantly, from underlying
economic reality. As a result, a key question presented by
the intangibles paradigm from the perspective of securities
laws is how to incorporate greater and more focused
information about intangibles into required company
disclosures.415

413. The legislative debate preceding passage of the Securities Act
demonstrates that a primary purpose of the Securities Act was to protect
investors by providing them with clear and adequate disclosure concerning
securities they purchased. See 77 CONG. REC. 2910-24 (1933).
414. Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 under the Securities Act of 1933"Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering,"
Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1974 SEC LEXIS 3297 (Apr. 23, 1974), at *2
("Congress, in enacting the federal securities laws, created a continuous
disclosure system designed to protect investors and to assure the maintenance
of fair and honest securities markets.").
415. See Langevoort, supra note 406, at 1154 (noting that clearer and more
focused disclosure requirements will in general lessen the opportunity for
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An intangibles securities disclosure framework, which
is a companion to the intangibles financial statement
reporting requirements discussed herein, represents a
potentially important step in incorporating greater
recognition of intangibles within existing securities
frameworks. Current disclosure requirements with respect
to real property in Regulation S-K Item 102 are based upon
assumptions about tangibles paradigm company operations. 416 Such requirements need to be updated to reflect
the reality of the intangibles paradigm. Since the SEC has
historically been at the forefront of enforcement of emerging
accounting issues, 417 specific SEC policies for intangibles
would be of enormous value in setting coherent standards
for disclosure with respect to intangibles. In addition, the
institutional structure of the accounting profession makes
regulatory intervention
from the SEC perspective all the
418
more important.
The implications of intangibles within existing
securities law rules should also be considered. Under
existing securities law standards, companies take care in
making public disclosures about information contained in
securities law filings. 419 This means that a company would
be unlikely, for example, to report financial statement
numbers in an SEC filing and then issue a press release
with numbers that are materially different than those in
"violation by rationalization" and may lead to more careful attention by
gatekeepers).
416. See Brookings Institution, Securities and Exchange Commission and
Financial Reporting Sub-Group Report, Understanding Intangible Sources of
Value, http://web.archive.org/web/20001218102700/http:/www.brook.edu/es/
researchlprojects/intangibles/doc/subsec.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006)
(hereinafter, Brookings SEC Report); Item 102, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.102 (2005).
417. Ehsan H. Feroz et al., The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 107, 112 (1991)
(noting that SEC enforcement actions pursue issues that touch on integrity of
the disclosure system and emerging accounting problems).
418. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1039 (noting that unlike the legal profession,
"with accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients'
certified financials").
419. The Rule 10b-5 standard, which imposes securities law liabilities for
any untrue statement or omission of a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, is one reason companies may take care in issuing public
statements. See supra note 201.
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the SEC filing. Company disclosures about intangibles are
at times not currently rooted to the same extent within
existing securities law frameworks as are disclosures in
other areas with respect to tangible assets. One core
element of intangibles paradigm discourse has been
assertions by companies with respect to intangibles about
which no specific disclosure may currently be required. This
has been true in the case of fraudulent disclosures such as
those at Enron as well as informational disclosures by
companies such as Cisco with respect to its virtual
operation. 420 When intangibles were less important, the
current framework was perhaps manageable. With the
proliferation of intangibles and the advent of the knowledge
economy, more specific structures need to be developed for
securities law disclosure requirements about intangibles.
An intangibles securities law disclosure framework
should begin with a requirement that the Management
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operation (MD&A) portion of required securities law
disclosures includes a clear and detailed discussion of the
role of intangibles within a company. 421 The imposition of
aggregate disclosures has been one recommendation made
with respect to intangibles. 422 Although aggregate disclosures, including disclosures concerning market capitalization and book value, are a step in the right direction, the
focus of any intangibles disclosure requirements should
encompass the aggregate contribution of intangibles to
overall company operations, as well as the importance of
individual intangibles that are significant drivers of
company value. This would mean more company disclosure
and warnings with respect to material future risks that are
often at the core of potential issues with intangibles
paradigm business operations. Current MD&A disclosure
requirements in general and not just with respect to
intangibles "fail to make sufficiently principled distinctions

420. See supra Part II.
421. Item 303 of Regulation S-K sets forth the requirements for MD&A
disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2005).
422. See Brookings SEC Report, supra note 416 (recommending that
disclosures concerning intangibles be made on an aggregate rather than
individual basis and that disclosures about market capitalization and book
value be required).
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and hence collapses into a muddle." 423 As a result, MD&A
should move away from the current "reasonably likely"
standard embedded therein to a framework that will give
investors greater warning of both the probability and
magnitude of material future risks. 424 Incorporating disclosure standards for intangibles in securities law disclosure
requirements is an important aspect of giving investors
greater understanding and warning of material future risks
with respect to intangibles. Such modifications of disclosure
standards will represent the first step in moving securities
law frameworks in a direction that reflects operation of the
intangibles paradigm.
CONCLUSION

Breaking through the intangibles haze requires
fundamental reassessment of accounting rules and legal
regimes in light of actual business practice in the
knowledge economy. It also involves recognition of motivations of various actors that might be involved in intangibles
paradigm misrepresentations. Such motivations might
include maintaining a high stock price, personal gain,
fraud, or other factors. The fundamental question of how
intangibles should be treated in light of changing business
practices remains an open one about which many different
legitimate approaches may exist under current disclosure
standards. Unfortunately, these legitimate differences
create a haze that also obscures illegitimate behavior such
as Enron's.
Current debates highlight the fact that accounting and
disclosure standards with respect to intangibles are
increasingly important given the sources of value for the
majority of companies today. The fact that the treatment of
intangibles is not addressed and such major sources of
value remain subject to differential accounting treatment
makes financial statements less useful and often not
reflective of underlying economic reality. This tends to
result in distortion of behavioral incentives and financial
measures of performance. To the extent that intangibles are
not adequately dealt with, a vacuum exists with respect to
companies' use of intangibles that makes company framing
423. Langevoort, supra note 406, at 1155.
424. Id. at 1155-56.
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and discourse much harder to evaluate. The resulting haze
is one that clearly needs to be addressed from the
perspective of applicable legal and accounting regimes intended to govern business. Addressing this haze will
require more than merely altering particular rules or
specific procedures, however. Rather, it necessitates
focusing on how to capture adequately contemporary business organization and practice in financial statements and
required securities law disclosure so as to reveal
information about companies that is relevant, material, and
representative of underlying economic reality.

